I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist. / October 2006

I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

I develop a novel metaphysical theory of the modal structure of the physical world, which has important consequences for debates regarding laws of nature, scientific explanation, the nature of physical properties, and the applicability of mathematics to science. The theory holds that modal properties of the physical world metaphysically depend on properties of mathematical structures. I show that the relation of metaphysical dependence is naturalistically acceptable by offering examples of non-causal scientific explanation that tacitly make use of such a notion. My view offers a non-Humean understanding of nomological necessity, a unification of the epistemology of modality with the epistemology of mathematics, and an explanation of the success of mathematics in predicting and explaining empirical phenomena. / text

Lucretius wrote his six-book philosophical epic poem De Rerum Natura a few decades before the fall of the Roman Republic and the start of the principate and the reign of Augustus in 27 BC, in a time of great social and political upheaval. This thesis examines Lucretius’ appropriation and correction of traditional Roman social and political rhetoric as part of his therapeutic philosophical programme, which aims to alleviate fear and anxiety through a rational understanding of nature. Specifically, this thesis examines Lucretius’ innovative use of foedus, a charged Roman word with many powerful connotations which is generally translated as “treaty”, “pact” or “covenant”. More than just an agreement, a foedus represented a divinely sanctioned ritualized contract between Rome and another polity, one which could not be broken without grave spiritual and political repercussions. They were an integral part of Roman life and culture and were strongly associated with imperialism, ambition, religion and sacrifice, and so Lucretius’ decision to adopt that word for the unthinking, unchanging, atheistic, necessary laws that limit and guide nature – despite his explicit condemnation of exactly those values foedus represents – is at first glance mystifying. As this thesis will show, however, foedus turns out to be an exceedingly apt choice, infusing almost every aspect of Lucretius’ Epicurean work with subtle complexity and meaning and contributing strongly to his polemical, therapeutic, ethical and didactic agendas. This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the social, political and philosophical contexts which influenced Lucretius to adopt Epicureanism. It then delves into some of the issues surrounding his innovative use of foedus. Chapter Two attempts to answer the research question of why foedus? by comparing and contrasting the essential characteristics of Roman foedera against those of Lucretius’ foedera naturae. This in turn provides a more detailed picture of Lucretius’ philosophical system both in terms of its physical and ethical doctrines, and suggests some possible motivations for Lucretius’ choice. Chapter Three looks at the deeper significance of Lucretius’ use of foedus and its role in his therapeutic programme of correction. Driving this chapter is Lucretius’ exploitation of the etymological connection between the noun foedus (‘treaty’, ‘covenant’) and the adjective foedus, ‘foul’. Chapter Three is divided into two sections, each focusing on Lucretius’ masterful manipulation of foedus and its etymological roots – as well as generic expectations and language in general –first for polemical purposes, then for therapeutic / Graduate / ltee.323@gmail.com

The purpose of this work is to provide a metaphysical theory of properties and scientific laws. This sentence will require some unpacking. By a ‘metaphysical’ theory here, I mean a theory of what exists in the world. In this investigation I am primarily concerned with a theory of what properties there are in the world and the role they play in scientific laws. This may be contrasted with a linguistic or epistemic project, as it is not primarily about our language, ideas, or theorizing but rather about what is in the world itself. Properties are what we may pre-philosophically think of as the characteristics of an object: such as its height, weight, color, etc. Investigation may cause us to doubt whether some of these pre-philosophical properties are genuine in a metaphysical sense: whether or not the property is actually present as a feature of the world. By scientific laws, I mean the statements we make in the form of exceptionless generalities about the world within the sciences. Here I do not mean to evaluate how science comes about these generalizations, only that they do and how these generalizations may be grounded in a metaphysical theory of properties. The link between these two things: properties and scientific laws, comes about because our scientific laws prominently feature properties: velocity, temperature, charge, viscosity, etc. After a review of some of the theories currently proposed in the philosophical literature along with a treatment of some of the problems that arise out of these theories, I will propose a new theory. This theory, entitled ‘Constitutive Trope Theory’ is a form of a ‘bundle trope theory’ as it proposes that objects in the world are composed entirely out of particularized properties. However, rather than proposing a primitive relation that does the bundling, this theory will propose that, at least for the objects we are familiar with, properties arise out of relations between lower-level properties that instantiate them. For example, a mammal may exist because of the relationship between the organs that lead to its unique properties as a mammal. Those organs in turn exist because of relationships between their cells that lead to their unique properties as a particular kind of organ. And so on down the chain until we hit ‘foundational properties’: properties which are not dependent on any other properties for their existence. I will say very little about these properties as I do not believe that any such properties have currently been found and will argue that such theorizing is premature before such properties have been empirically identified. Following this account, I will consider some of the problems that must be overcome and some final considerations in favor of this theory over other competing theories of properties and scientific laws.

Compared to the solo percussion works, little academic work has been done in the research and analysis of percussion ensemble compositions. David Lang, a Pulitzer Prize winning composer, has written many prominent works for percussion in both the solo and chamber setting. His work, The So-Called Laws of Nature for percussion quartet, written in 2001, has quickly become standard repertoire. Lang composed the piece with many overlapping processes, patterns that are affected in a pre-defined manner, in line with his totalist style. Using traditional analytical methods would not accurately represent the complexity the work has to offer to the performer. This paper will attempt to find musical significance by breaking down the individual processes.The conclusions from this research are mostly open-ended and, to some extent, subjective. The most effective performers will take the objective analytical information and use it to create an informed, well-intentioned, subjective experience. In this study of The So-Called Laws of Nature the analysis attempts to connect the objective--the data--and the subjective--the analysis of that data--to work together to aid the performer to create the best possible musical and ultimately artistic interpretation.

Malgré un antipsychologisme plusieurs fois réasserté, le philosophe américain Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) maintient une dépendance ambiguë de la connaissance objective envers les états mentaux de la conscience. La thèse rend compte de ce paradoxe apparent en montrant que le projet peircien n'est pas logique mais épistémologique, et consiste en une étude critique de notre pouvoir de connaître. Peirce a cherché différentes manières de naturaliser la connaissance, c'est-à-dire de l'inscrire dans nos facultés réelles sans pour autant renoncer à son ambition fondationnelle et normative. On peut en distinguer plusieurs phases successives : la correction de la psychologie des facultés, la théorie de l'enquête, les recherches en psychologie expérimentale, la création d'un associationnisme logique, une cosmologie de la préformation de la raison, l'invention d'une phénoménologie, et finalement le dialogisme graphique. Ces tentatives plus ou moins heureuses fournissent des outils pour penser aujourd'hui une théorie de la connaissance dans un cadre naturaliste. / In spite of his several times restated antipsychologism, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) still ambiguously assumes that objective knowledge depends on the mental states of consciousness. The thesis accounts for this apparent paradox in showing that Peirce's purport is epistemological, not logical, and consists in a critical approach to our power of knowing. Peirce sought various ways of naturalizing knowledge, i.e. making it rely on our real faculties, yet without giving up a normative foundation. One can identify a sequence of such attempts : correcting faculty psychology, the theory of inquiry, experimental psychology, logical associationism, a cosmology of preformed reason, the invention of a phenomenology, and finally graphical dialogism. These more or less successful attempts provide tools to conceive today a theory of knowledge in a naturalistic frame.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 507590 bytes, checksum: 47c590de717391d97a0200d47f39cdbf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work aims at examining how Donald Davidson conceives the analysis of causation, what is involved in that relation its ontology and, therefore, examine how he understands the laws of nature as universal causal statements and its connection with singular causal statements. These questions are related to the assumption, by Davidson, that events are a fundamental ontological category, and that singular causal statements ought to be instances of causal laws, which form differs little from such singular statements, i.e., laws would be general causal statements that are purely extensional. We will carry out an investigation on possible consequences related to Davidson s strategy, with an argument in favor of the idea that the fundamental physical entities would more properly constitute the causal relata. This investigation will take two directions: in the first one we will raise a brief history of the concept of causality; and in the second one, we will search for a dialogue with Physics. Then, we will show the difficulties in that approach. Taking our first direction, Davidson´s treatment appears to be, from a logical point of view, satisfactory, in a sense that the causal relata are particular and dated events, which are subjected to quantification, selected by descriptions and governed by the rules of extensional logic. On our second direction, an examination on the characteristics of the laws of nature will be carried out, particularly, the laws of Physics, considering the physicalist perspective that we have adopted as a starting point. We defend, contrary to Davidson, that laws are intentional statements, and then, singular causal statements would not be instances of laws, in the sense that such statements could be constructed by substitution of coextensive terms in the law statements. There would be something like a subject change while using laws to make singular causal statements; more precisely, the laws of physics would offer the elements for the construction of such statements. / A tarefa que se põe neste trabalho é a de examinar como Donald Davidson entende a análise da causalidade, o que está envolvido nessa relação sua ontologia e, por conseguinte, examinar o que ele entende que seriam as leis da natureza como enunciados causais universais e sua ligação com os enunciados causais singulares. Tais questões giram em torno da assunção, em Davidson, que eventos constituem uma categoria ontológica fundamental, e que enunciados causais singulares instanciam leis causais que, em sua forma, pouco difeririam de tais enunciados singulares, isto é, leis seriam enunciados causais gerais extensionais. Será levado adiante um exame das possíveis conseqüências relacionadas à estratégia de Davidson, com uma argumentação a favor da idéia de que seriam as entidades físicas fundamentais que constituiriam mais apropriadamente os relata causais, alimentada por uma investigação que tomará dois caminhos: o primeiro de levantar um breve histórico da noção de causalidade; e um segundo, buscando um diálogo com a Física. Mostraremos, então, as dificuldades relacionadas a essa abordagem. Com isso, o tratamento dado por Davidson se apresentará, de um ponto de vista lógico, satisfatório, de maneira que os relata da relação de causalidade serão eventos, particulares datados e como tais, sujeitos à quantificação, selecionados por descrições e sujeitos às regras da lógica extensional. No outro pólo de nossa investigação, será encaminhado um exame das características das leis da natureza, em especial, das leis da Física, haja vista a perspectiva fisicalista aqui adotada como ponto de partida. Defenderemos, contra Davidson, que leis são enunciados intensionais, de modo que os enunciados causais singulares não seriam, segundo nossa argumentação, instâncias de leis no sentido de que tais enunciados poderiam ser construídos por substituições de termos coextensionais dos enunciados das leis. Haveria algo como uma mudança de assunto ao usar leis para criar enunciados causais singulares; mais precisamente, as leis físicas ofereceriam elementos para a construção de tais enunciados.

Humeans say that laws depend on their instances. Another way of saying this is that the instances explain the laws. However, laws are often used in science to help explain these same instances. If this is true it appears as though the instances help explain themselves, which would be a serious problem for the Humeans (Miller, 2015, pp. 1314-1317). In this essay I expand on a solution proposed by Miller (2015, pp. 1328-1331) that the laws are not explained by their instances but rather grounded by a set of global facts. I develop this into a new framework in which it would be expected for the laws to not be grounded by their instances. I call this framework conjunction monism since the core idea is a that conjunctions ground their conjuncts. I finish with a discussion about the compatibility of conjunction monism and Humeanism.