The function of budgetary controls is to control the resource allocation within companies. It can also be an instrument for measure and control subordinates and/or business units’ performance (Van der Stede 2001). This paper concerns the latter; when the budgetary control function is used to measure and control subordinates performance based on budget. Previous research in this area has not yet accomplished to explain the effects of tight budgetary control which Hartman (2000) considers as the main issue to be concerned about in management accounting research. Previous research has presented contradictory findings regarding tight budgetary control explained by positive effects as well as negative effects during the last decades. Further, these findings provide us with contradictory results in which budget participation is initiating intended effects or unintended effects such as budgetary slack. With this in mind we have invented a model including these variables, intended to find the context and effects. This study includes subordinates from different companies within Sweden and it is based upon a self-completion survey. Our intention with this paper is to present an explanation according to budgetary slack. The result shows that tight budgetary control does affect the degree of slack as well as participation do. Further, we present evidence that high participation moderates the effect of tight budgetary control on slack.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:kau-13999 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Wilbs, Tobias, Hult, Pontus |
| Publisher | Karlstads universitet, Avdelningen för företagsekonomi, Karlstads universitet, Avdelningen för företagsekonomi |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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