This thesis examines the role of market micro-structure and communication in takeovers that involve shareholders' investment decisions and the selection of a takeover mechanism by a raider under asymmetric information. For this purpose, rational expectations equilibrium models are employed and examples are worked in detail. / In the context of market micro-structure, it is shown that there is a greater probability of success of a takeover when the shareholders are risk averse that when they are risk neutral, and the probability that a takeover succeeds is related non-positively to the fraction of shares held by the raider. / In order to study communication, two takeover mechanisms are studied which are tender offers and negotiated takeovers. A negotiated takeover allows for communication between the shareholders and the raider before any takeover announcement. It is shown that communication offsets partially the negative impact of risk aversion on the probability that a hostile takeover occurs.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.29086 |
| Date | January 1995 |
| Creators | Mathieu, Claude, 1962- |
| Contributors | Sealey, C. W. (advisor), Nagarajan, S. (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Faculty of Management.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001475779, proquestno: NN08134, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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