This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:546284 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Scorzo, Greg |
| Publisher | University of Nottingham |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/ |
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