Complex bargaining between domestic and international actors has characterized world trade since the end of World War II. Moravcsik's commercial liberalism explains that trade policy stems from individuals within democracies, who indicate rational preferences to the government. In the structure of Putnam's two-level game, preferences are then aggregated by self-interested government officials who must reconcile constituency interests with pressures from foreign partners to form trade policy. Since 1995, the structure of world trade has been fundamentally redefined by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Dispute Settlement Understanding has erected a supranational trade judiciary, effectively institutionalizing global increasingly free trade. The independent authority of the WTO has created a three-level strategic game between the domestic, international, and supranational political economic arenas. As illustrated in the softwood lumber dispute and the Boeing-Airbus dispute, the three-level game further empowers a powerful minority to capitalize on a collective action problem in world trade via dispute settlement. Olson's logic of collective action explains the ability of small self-interested coalitions to seek rent from the government, compromising the interests of the latent constituency majority. The result is a politicization of world trade that ultimately threatens the very underpinnings of the WTO itself.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ucf.edu/oai:stars.library.ucf.edu:honorstheses1990-2015-1597 |
| Date | 01 January 2006 |
| Creators | Roth, Jeremy |
| Publisher | STARS |
| Source Sets | University of Central Florida |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Source | HIM 1990-2015 |
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