<p>The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected.</p>

<p>The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM / The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected. / South Africa

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L’objectif de cette thèse est d’étudier comment les pays membres de l’OMC peuvent gérer leurs différends commerciaux. Dans le premier chapitre, nous analysons empiriquement les déterminants de la participation des pays membres de l’OMC à son organe de règlement des différends (ORD). Nous démontrons que la probabilité qu’un pays porte plainte devant l’ORD dépend de sa structure commerciale, mais également de ses capacités légales et de représailles commerciales. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous déterminons l’impact du commerce illégal sur le bien-être économique. Pour cela, nous construisons un modèle en équilibre partiel dans lequel nous ajoutons du commerce illégal. De plus, nous appliquons ce modèle au trafic d’avocats au Costa Rica. Nos résultats indiquent que le commerce illégal augmente le bien-être économique par rapport à une situation « sans commerce » illégal. En revanche, par rapport à une situation de « libre-échange », le commerce illégal ne compense pas toujours pour les effets néfastes provenant d’une mesure commerciale restrictive. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous utilisons un modèle en équilibre général afin de déterminer si les États-Unis peuvent bénéficier de la menace et/ou de la mise en place d’une politique commerciale basée sur la réciprocité stricte. Nous démontrons que bien que la menace de représailles puisse générer un gain global, sa mise en place réduirait le bien-être économique des États-Unis et du monde. / The objective of this dissertation is to explore how WTO members may respond to trade disputes. In chapter one, we empirically investigate whether the WTO DSS is beyond reach of developing countries. We find that while the structure of trade plays an important role in explaining the probability that a WTO member initiates a dispute at the WTO DSS, the legal capacity and the trade retaliatory capacity of a country also affects its participation in the DSS. In chapter two, we aim to determine the impact of smuggling on economic welfare. We build a partial equilibrium model of trade in which we introduce illegal trade and apply this model to the smuggling of avocado in Costa Rica. Our results show that smuggling improves welfare compared to the “no-smuggling” situation. Compared to the “free-trade” situation, smuggling does not always compensate for the negative effects arising from the restrictive trade measure. In chapter three, we use a general equilibrium model of trade to determine whether the United States may benefit from the threat and/or application of strict reciprocity against its main trading partners. We demonstrate that while the threat of retaliation through reciprocal taxes may generate a global gain, its effective application would reduce the United States and the world’s welfare.

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Complex bargaining between domestic and international actors has characterized world trade since the end of World War II. Moravcsik's commercial liberalism explains that trade policy stems from individuals within democracies, who indicate rational preferences to the government. In the structure of Putnam's two-level game, preferences are then aggregated by self-interested government officials who must reconcile constituency interests with pressures from foreign partners to form trade policy. Since 1995, the structure of world trade has been fundamentally redefined by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Dispute Settlement Understanding has erected a supranational trade judiciary, effectively institutionalizing global increasingly free trade. The independent authority of the WTO has created a three-level strategic game between the domestic, international, and supranational political economic arenas. As illustrated in the softwood lumber dispute and the Boeing-Airbus dispute, the three-level game further empowers a powerful minority to capitalize on a collective action problem in world trade via dispute settlement. Olson's logic of collective action explains the ability of small self-interested coalitions to seek rent from the government, compromising the interests of the latent constituency majority. The result is a politicization of world trade that ultimately threatens the very underpinnings of the WTO itself.

Dispute Settlement in the WTO Veronika Honzíková Abstract The WTO dispute settlement represents a significant improvement compared to the dispute settlement system under GATT 1947, but is still considered as his successor. The mechanism under GATT 1947 had many weaknesses which resulted to the need of reform. The procedure under GATT 1947 was not contradictory and all members of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) were entitled to use the veto right when adopting the reports. The contracting parties were conscious of such weaknesses and they have agreed on a new dispute settlement system during the Uruguay round. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The new system remains inter-state mechanism and as a consequence, available only to the Member States, excluding individuals and business operators. The dispute settlement under WTO has become compulsory while leaving each member the choice between this standard procedure and other dispute modes, such as Good Offices, Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. The dispute settlement system has been unified and has become more judicial. It excludes national jurisdictions and means strengthening the multilateralism. The dispute settlement is administrated by the Dispute Settlement Body,...

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 204-222).

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