A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help the incumbent firm fight off competition by promoting new exploration and risk-taking. In the case of the incumbent, the stock options are shown to be most effective when introduced as a response to the arrival of a new entrant, rather than used as a standard part of the compensation package. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:epub-wu-01_591 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Creators | Sallans, Brian, Pfister, Alexander, Dorffner, Georg |
| Publisher | SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Paper, NonPeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://epub.wu.ac.at/1462/ |
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