併購是企業成長最快捷的手段，題企業經營的大戰略，然而併購決策可能隱含著經理人或制股東的自利動機，而不是為長遠的股東權益著想，可能作出錯誤的併購決策而讓股東血本無歸。本研究探究主併企業之公司治理機制可否有效監督管理階層作出審慎的併購決策，從股權結構觀點出發，以發生於1996年至2003年間，主併公司為公開發行公司之併購案件共112件為研究樣本，探討主併公司各種股權結構與併購後長期財務績效的關聯性。
實證結果顯示，未擔任董監事的經理人持股比例與併購後績效呈現顯著的正相關，與利益一致假說相符，機構持股比例與併購後績效亦呈顯著的正相關，符合效率監督假說，衡量控制股東負面侵佔誘因的席次盈餘偏離倍數則與併購後績效呈現顯著的負相關。此實證結果隱喻，控制股東是否具有強烈的侵佔誘因係影響併購決策優劣最重要的因素。 / Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most efficient ways to meet the need of corporation expansion, and therefore are the most important business strategies. Nevertheless, the past studies indicate managerial incentives as well as self-interests of controlling stockholders may drive some mergers that ultimately reduce the long-run value of the firm. This study examines whether corporate governance mechanism helps management make acquisition decisions based on stockholders’ interests. Using a sample of 112 acquisition cases during the period of 1996 to 2003 which the acquiring firms are public traded firms, the study empirically investigates the effect of ownership structure of acquiring firms’ on post-acquisiton long-run financial performance. The primary empirical results show that the shareholdings of managers who don’t serve as directors or supervisors of the board have a positive impact on post-acquisiton performance, institution ownership also has a positive impact on post-acquisiton performance, while the deviation between the seat-control rights ratio and cash-flow rights of controlling stockholder has a negative impact on post-acquisiton performance. The results thus imply that whether the controlling stockholder has strong incentive of expropriation is the key to the quality of acquisition.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0095353027 |
| Creators | 張文嘉 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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