Subjects in laboratory experiments are prone to effects of social desirability. This reactive behavior is due to the subjects perceived anonymity in the entire experiment. Especially, socially desirable behavior is also triggered by assembling and/or payment procedures that are not anonymous. Indeed, in a laboratory experiments with a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and perfect stranger anonymity
subjects (n=174) showed significantly different cooperation rates depending on the anonymity conditions during assembling and the payment procedure, ranging from 33.3% to 19.9%. In addition, a first experiment with the PD and anonymous payment and double blind experimenting lead to a cooperation rate of 33.3%. Only after the same subjects (n=34) took part a second time in same, entire experiment,
the cooperation rate fell to 8.8%. Therefore this measurement of the cooperation rates in a laboratory experiment failed the test-retest check on reliability. This happened though all manipulations used fulfilled the standards of fully anonymous experimenting. This means that such processes could go unnoticed and bias the results of any standard laboratory experiment on cooperation in one shot decisions. Therefore, in accordance with the textbook logic of laboratory experiments, but in contrast to a common practice (cf. Behavioral Game
Theory) marginal totals from cooperation experiments in the laboratory should not be interpreted.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa:de:qucosa:12795 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Berger, Roger |
| Contributors | Universität Leipzig |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | doc-type:workingPaper, info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper, doc-type:Text |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-148585, qucosa:12748 |
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