The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan
Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential
administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of
Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing
the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the
volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely
Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model,
this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met,
why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan
Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola
or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a
written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant
part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted
the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US
Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that
President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real
significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such
reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and
Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the
“Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the
3
same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government
bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is
devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians
(both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making
process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the
doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan
Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their
objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other
factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:unisa/oai:uir.unisa.ac.za:10500/5454 |
| Date | 01 1900 |
| Creators | Venables, Robert Andrew |
| Contributors | Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | 1 online resource (138 leaves), application/pdf |
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