An acquisition bid is like any other proposal for risky investment. The difference arises due to additional source of risk arising from two different sources of information asymmetry due to private knowledge held by the bidder and target. We hypothesize that the bidding process evolves in a manner to optimize bidder's investment in the target through a process of joint signalling. Medium of exchange and bid premium are used as the two signal elements simultaneously by the bidder. We develop a multiple signalling model of the bidding process which is fully revealing in equilibrium.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc278630 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Tiwari, Rajesh Kumar |
| Contributors | Schutte, David P., Pavur, Robert J., Karafiath, Imre, 1955-, Monticino, Michael G. |
| Publisher | University of North Texas |
| Source Sets | University of North Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | vii, 182 leaves: ill., Text |
| Rights | Public, Copyright, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved., Tiwari, Rajesh Kumar |
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