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Secularism: A Measure of Explicit Agreement With Assumptions of Secularism (MEAAS)

Values are inherent within cultures, relationships, and many other systems, however, little study has been done on the extent to which individuals may explicitly agree with the metaphysical assumptions that much of psychological science relies upon. Psychological science, which uses scientific methodology, is a trusted source of knowledge for many students. Scientific methodology is conceptually linked to assumptions of naturalism, which makes claims about the truth of reality. These naturalistic assumptions pertain to ideas of disenchantment, which describe the world as free from any transcendent quality. These same ideas have become popular among people of the Western world and are foundational to the worldview of secularism. Accessing whether, and to what extent, individuals explicitly agree or disagree with ideas of disenchantment inherent within secularism may help to better understand relationships between cultural, educational, and spiritual beliefs, and the underlying presumptions of psychological science. A measure of 30 items in length was created in order to evaluate the extent to which individuals agree with statements about some of the foundational assumptions of secularism as it relates to naturalism. A random sample of online participants (N=395) completed the items through an online survey platform. A 1-factor model provided sufficient statistical fit for the data, suggesting that items appeared to support the idea that this measure addresses attitudes of secularism, however no claims on the validity of the measure in the current study can be made. Suggestions for future study are provided.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:BGMYU2/oai:scholarsarchive.byu.edu:etd-10234
Date06 August 2021
CreatorsJones, Conner Douglas
PublisherBYU ScholarsArchive
Source SetsBrigham Young University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceTheses and Dissertations
Rightshttps://lib.byu.edu/about/copyright/

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