本研究主要針對影響董監酬勞與會計(市場)績效關聯性之因素進行探討。在現代公司之經營管理架構中，係由股東在股東大會選出代表進入董事會，由董事會成員選出主要執行業務經營之人，並代理所有投資人監督及管理經營層。換言之，相對於經理人，董事會成員為股東最為直接之代理人。因此，本研究認為董事會成員為外部股東最直接之代理人，故以董監酬勞為分析對象，從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(如是屬於家族控制企業、董監持股、外部大股東持股等)及董事會特性(獨立董監席次比率、董事是否兼任經理人、董事長是否兼任總經理)等相關變數，探討其對於董監酬勞與會計、市場績效間關聯性之影響。
實證結果顯示，家族企業與公司經理人兼任董事會職位時，會提升董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性；董監持股比例愈高、外部大股東持股比例愈高、獨立董監席次比例越高及董事長兼任總經理時，會降低董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性。 / This study argues that members of corporate boards are the most direct delegate of external shareholders. Agency problem may exist between board members and external shareholders. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market over 1996-2005, this study empirically examines the effect of ownership and board structures on the compensation of board members. This study expects that the pay-performance sensitivity of board compensation is weakened when a strong monitoring mechanism is in place. Using return on assets as the measures for performance, the primary empirical results show that family-controlled firms and firms with representation of executive directors illustrate higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, firms with higher shareholdings by board members and by outside block holders, and firms with representation of independent board members demonstrate lower pay-performance sensitivity.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0094353010 |
| Creators | 蔡雅媛 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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