本研究主要針對影響董監酬勞與會計(市場)績效關聯性之因素進行探討。在現代公司之經營管理架構中，係由股東在股東大會選出代表進入董事會，由董事會成員選出主要執行業務經營之人，並代理所有投資人監督及管理經營層。換言之，相對於經理人，董事會成員為股東最為直接之代理人。因此，本研究認為董事會成員為外部股東最直接之代理人，故以董監酬勞為分析對象，從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(如是屬於家族控制企業、董監持股、外部大股東持股等)及董事會特性(獨立董監席次比率、董事是否兼任經理人、董事長是否兼任總經理)等相關變數，探討其對於董監酬勞與會計、市場績效間關聯性之影響。 實證結果顯示，家族企業與公司經理人兼任董事會職位時，會提升董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性；董監持股比例愈高、外部大股東持股比例愈高、獨立董監席次比例越高及董事長兼任總經理時，會降低董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性。 / This study argues that members of corporate boards are the most direct delegate of external shareholders. Agency problem may exist between board members and external shareholders. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market over 1996-2005, this study empirically examines the effect of ownership and board structures on the compensation of board members. This study expects that the pay-performance sensitivity of board compensation is weakened when a strong monitoring mechanism is in place. Using return on assets as the measures for performance, the primary empirical results show that family-controlled firms and firms with representation of executive directors illustrate higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, firms with higher shareholdings by board members and by outside block holders, and firms with representation of independent board members demonstrate lower pay-performance sensitivity.

公司在追求規模經濟的同時，由於其所有者的時間精力有限，就必須放釋放一定的代理權，以求得企業的規模發展。當代理權釋出後，代理關係就無可避免，利害關係衝突於是產生。代理人會傾向偷懶、保守、自利、短視，以維護自己的利益，引發了所謂的代理成本，於是便需要公司治理機制加以解決。本研究除了繼續以前的研究探討我國上市電子公司之股權結構及董監酬勞與員工分紅對公司績效的影響外，由於我國高科技業的「員工分紅配股」措施，使公司的股本增大，造成其EPS降低、股價的稀釋及選舉權受到侵蝕，因而損害原股東的權益。因此，本研究也欲探討我國上市電子公司股權結構是否會影響其董監酬勞及員工分紅政策。 本研究以1997起至2002年止台灣上市電子公司為樣本，經刪除資料不完整的公司後，共計有55家公司330個觀察值為研究樣本。本研究是以複迴歸模型來進行實證研究。實證結果顯示經理人持股比率、機構法人持股比率、董事監察人持股比率，以及員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率與公司績效呈正相關。經理人持股比率及機構投資者持股比率與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率呈正相關，至於董事持股比率、監察人持股比率及監察人佔全部董事監察人比率，則與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率無關。 / When the size of the company is growing, the owners of the company have the limit time and the energy, the company must have the agent. Once the company has the agent, the interest relationship among the owner and agent will conflict. The agents are easily lazy, conservative, selfish, and nearsighted to pursue their interest, so the agent cost happen. This study beside continue the former research about the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance, and the relationship between the the the employee bonus and the company performance in the TSE-listed electronic company. Because the high-tech company in Taiwan practice the policy of “the employee stock distribution”, the policy will cause the expansion of the stock. The expansion of the stock lessens the EPS, dilutes the stock price and erodes the right of the election. That damage the right of the original stockholders, and therefore this study examine the relationship between the ownership structure and the employee bonus in the TSE-listed electronic company as well. This study samples are the TSE-listed electronic company from 1997 to 2002, but exclude the company with insufficient data. The rest are 55 companies, and 330 observations that are obtained. This study uses complex regression model on this empirical research. The empirical result indicates the stock ownership of the managers, the stock ownership of the institution investors, the stock ownership of the board, and the bonus rate of the employee are positively related to the company performance. The stock ownership of the manager, and the stock ownership of the institution investors are positively related to the employee bonus rate. The stock ownership of the directors, the stock ownership of the supervisors, and the supervisor rate of the board reveal no significant relationship with the bonus rate of the employee.

自去年金融海嘯爆發，許多公司雖然經營績效不佳，其管理階層卻坐領高薪，經過媒體的大幅報導，使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓與黃金降落傘之現象。針對上述不合理的現象，投資大眾期能藉由公司所揭露的訊息，瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬之間是否具有合理的關係，並進行必要之監督。此外，股東行動主義逐漸抬頭，投資大眾可利用企業所揭露之資訊判斷公司大小情事，其中包括是否存在著公司經營不善，董監事卻溢領高薪的情況。另一方面，坐領高薪之管理階層為避免引起眾怒，可能會減少資訊之數量及降低資訊之品質，以減低其領取不合理之酬勞而引發社會譁然之機率。因此，本研究之目的在於探討公司董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性，並藉由實證資料驗證我國企業是否存在著此種規避資訊揭露之現象。 本研究實證結果顯示，董監事為了確保其本身之利益，而維持高額之董監酬勞時，可能增加董監事與管理階層合謀之機會，而共同隱藏不利之訊息，降低其資訊揭露透明度。此外，董監酬勞占公司淨利之比例增加時，董監事個人利益與公司營運成敗的關係愈密切，而影響董監事之獨立性。換言之，董監酬勞占淨利比較高之公司較會隱藏對其不利之訊息，使得該公司資訊揭露透明度降低。再者，公司董監酬勞異常高於同業平均值時，會促使董監事隱藏與董監酬勞相關之資訊，減少其資訊揭露之數量與品質，而降低其資訊揭露透明度。 / Since the global financial tsunami broke out in 2008, many corporations have performed poorly, but their top management still receives high compensations. Through the reports in news media, people become more concerned with the unreasonable phenomenon of corporate “Fat Cat” and “Golden Parachute”. Investors are paying more attention to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between corporate performance and directors’ compensations and to perform necessary monitoring. On the other hand, directors who receive high salaries may reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between directors’ compensations and corporate information transparency. The empirical results show that for the directors and supervisors to maintain their high compensation, they may collude with the management in hiding negative information and reducing corporate information transparency. In addition, when directors’ compensations were abnormally higher than the industry average, they had a tendency to hide the compensation information or reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed. Consequently, these corporations had lower information transparency.

公司的順利有效運作仰賴企業整體共同努力，透過發放以公司績效為計算基礎的酬勞及紅利，期望能增加董監與員工的工作動機，進而達到提升公司績效之目的。然而，我國於費用化制度實施前，董監酬勞與員工紅利之會計處理係作為盈餘分配項，而非列為薪資費用，此作法受到外資及投資法人的批評，認為台灣企業的財務報表無法允當表達其實質經營狀況。為消除相關人士的抨擊，並與國際會計準則接軌，我國陸續修訂法律、頒布公報及解釋函令，規定自2008年1月1日起，員工分紅及董監酬勞費用化制度正式開始實施。 本研究欲探討在費用化制度實施後，公司的酬勞及紅利制度將產生什麼變化，且該項制度的變動是否會改變對董監及員工的激勵誘因，進而影響公司績效。本研究實證結果顯示，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，公司發放的董監酬勞佔稅後淨利比例無顯著變化。在員工紅利部分，現金紅利比重提高，股票紅利比重則降低。無論於費用化制度實施前或後，給予員工現金或股票紅利，皆有助於公司提升經營績效；惟費用化後，現金紅利之激勵效果變差，股票紅利則變好。此外，若同時比較員工現金與股票紅利兩者，可發現無論是費用化實施前或實施後，現金紅利對於提升公司經營績效之效果皆較佳。 / The success of corporate operations relies on the efforts of all people in the firm. By distributing compensation and bonus which are based on corporate performance, it not only can enhance directors’ and employees’ work motivation, but also achieve the purpose of better corporate performance. The accounting treatment for director compensation or employee bonus used to be recognized as a part of corporate earnings distribution, not as an expense. This method was, however, criticized for its failure to present the true operating results of a company. In order to solve this problem and in accordance with the IFRS treatment, the government amended the related laws and required that both director compensation and employee bonus be recognized as salary expense after January 1, 2008. The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in director compensation and employee bonus after the above new regulation took effect. This study also examines whether this change alters the incentives to directors and employees. The empirical results show that after the new accounting treatment, no significant changes in the percentage of director compensation to net income. When it comes to employee bonus, the percentage of cash bonus increased, but the stock bonus declined. In addition, employee cash and stock bonus, no matter being treated as an expense or not, did help the firms to enhance performance. However, cash bonus’ motivation effect became lesser, whereas stock bonus’ effect increased. Furthermore, cash bonus was more effective than stock bonus in improving corporate performance before and after the expense treatment for employee bonus.

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.