本研究以民國94年至97年曾採私募增資之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，並以我國之資訊揭露評鑑結果作為衡量資訊透明度之變數，探討私募增資決策是否影響企業資訊透明度。 研究結果發現，無論是上市或上櫃公司，在私募前皆會提昇其資訊透明度，顯示潛在應募人係以資訊透明度作為投資標的之參考依據，使得企業在進行私募增資之前，為降低私募過程之資訊不對稱性，會選擇提昇其資訊透明度，藉以吸引潛在應募人透過私募來投資。 此外，實證顯示上市公司在私募後會提昇其資訊透明度，顯示應募人在私募中投入大量資金後，受我國法規規範三年內不得任意轉售私募之有價證券，而有強烈的動機發揮其專業能力監督公司之經營，提昇公司之資訊透明度。

近幾年來公司治理已成為熱門的管理議題之一。尤其是安隆（Enron）案之後，市場投資人與債權人對公司管理當局之不信任日益加重，此時公司若能開誠佈公告知利害關係人其相關之資訊，非但能提升公司之資訊透明度，亦獲取投資人的重新認可，即為一種最有效解決代理問題之管道。然其中能完善建立此種管道即須透過公司治理的相關機制。而當有了健全的公司治理機制，企業才有可能在進一步順利地在資本市場上籌措資金，進而維持公司的長期競爭力，取得永續經營。 因此，本研究以國內電子業上市公司為樣本，民國91年為研究期間，嘗試對企業資訊透明度以綜合性的指標衡量，探討公司治理結構對資訊透明度的影響。此外，再從投資人之觀點來看，探究公司資訊透明度之高低，對投資人而言，其獲取之股價報酬之變異程度，是否會因資訊透明度之高低而有顯著之變動。 研究結果顯示： 1. 控制股東的盈餘分配權愈大，資訊透明度愈高；控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離程度愈大，資訊透明度愈高，不符合原先預期；控制股東掌控之監察人席次愈高則資訊透明度愈低。 2. 資訊透明度之高低對股票報酬變異性有顯著負相關影響。 3. 當加入公司治理結構後，公司治理之變數對股票報酬之變異性並無顯著之影響，亦即無增額之解釋能力。 / Recently, corporate governance has become one of the most popular managerial issues, especially after the case of Enron fraud. Since then, the relationship between the company management and market investors has aggravated increasingly due to lack of trust. It is believed that if the company management can frankly and earnestly publish related information to the stakeholders, the company’s transparency and thus the investors’ trust will be promoted. This approach may be the most effective one to solve the agency problem between the owners and the company management. However the success of this approach depends on good corporate governance. Sound corporate governance will make enterprises sustainable and competitive in the long-run. The research uses a sample of Taiwan electronic companies of 2002 to examine the effect of corporate governance factors on the transparency of the company. The corporate governance factors in the study include ownership structure, institutional investors, and independent directors and supervisors. In addition, the research also investigates the effect of transparency and corporate governance factors on the variation of stock return. The empirical results indicate follows: 1. Controlling shareholder’ cash flow rights and the deviation of voting rights and cash flow rights have significantly positive effect on company’s transparency; the proportion of audit committee members related to controlling shareholder has significantly negative effect on company’s transparency. 2. Company’s transparency has significantly negative effect on the variation of stock return. 3. There is no incremental information content of corporate governance factors on the variation of stock returns after controlling for the effect of information transparency.

本篇研究以Ohlson(1995)權益評價模式，探討不同資訊透明度下財稅差異之組成分及其對價值攸關性之影響，實證結果如下： 資訊揭露程度表彰公司透明度，資訊揭露程度較高之公司代表「較透明公司」，本研究以證券暨期貨市場發展基金會之公司治理評鑑結果為A++、A+與A之公司代表公司資訊透明度。預期較透明公司之財稅差異主要可能導因於租稅規劃，而增加盈餘價值攸關性，減少權益帳面價值攸關性。即，評鑑結果為A++、A+與A之公司相對於評鑑結果為A－、B、C、C－公司，其財稅差異較具資訊性。資訊揭露程度「較不透明公司」，即評鑑結果為A－、B、C、C－之公司，財稅差異主要可能係盈餘管理，而降低盈餘價值攸關性，增加權益帳面價值攸關性。即，評鑑結果為A－、B、C、C－公司相對於評鑑結果為A++、A+與A之公司，其財稅差異可能富含投機性而損害盈餘資訊性。實證結果顯示，不論資訊透明度高低，期財稅差異主要可能係投機性盈餘管理，且資訊揭露程度似乎不影響其盈餘管理動機。

全球弊案陸續發生，投資大眾信心受創，對提升資訊透明度以及資訊品質正確性愈來愈殷切，主管機關為了維護資本市場，修改相關法規、制定相關政策以確保資訊正確性，另外，我國資訊揭露評鑑主要是希望藉由評鑑的機制，使公司對資訊揭露能有所重視。 本研究主要分別探討資訊揭露水準與資訊品質(盈餘品質)對於股票市場流動性的影響，並參考Francis et al. (2008) 的作法，探討資訊揭露水準與股票市場流動性間之關係在納入盈餘品質考量後，結果是否改變，檢視盈餘品質與資訊揭露水準之關係在台灣市場為何。 本研究採用我國的資訊揭露評鑑系統之評鑑結果來衡量資訊揭露，研究結果發現，公司資訊揭露水準愈高，股票市場流動性愈好，盈餘品質愈好，股票市場流動性愈好，但資訊揭露水準與股票市場流動性的關係在納入盈餘品質後，其結果並無明顯差異，推論在台灣市場中，除了盈餘品質外，尚有許多因素影響公司資訊揭露政策。 / Investors confidence in companies is decreasing due to the increasing rigged cases around the world. Therefore, information transparency and accuracy receives much more attention than ever. In order to protect the capital market and ensure information accuracy, the authorities have taken several steps such as relevant laws introduction and regulation amendments. The purpose of establishing Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System in Taiwan is to expect the companies would take information disclosure more seriously. This research is to explore the impacts of information disclosure level and qualities on stock markets liquidity. Furthermore, followingFrancis et al. (2008), this research aims to investigate the impact of information qualities in Taiwan capital market by explore the correlation between information disclosure and the liquidity of stock markets after the adoption of information disclosure and transparency ranking system. This research evaluates the information disclosure by adopting the Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System in Taiwan. The research finds that the higher the information disclosure level , the better the liquidity of stock market . Furthermore, the research also finds that the better the earnings quality, the better the liquidity of stock market . However, the correlation between the information disclosure level and the liquidity of stock markets reveals no significant difference after taking earnings quality into consideration. Therefore, we conclude that information disclosure is affected by many other factors in the company.

過去文獻指出，當企業之資訊透明度越高時，追隨企業的財務分析師越多，盈餘的預測偏誤、預測離散度越小；另外，當企業資訊透明度較高時，其管理階層也會因為外部人的監督而減少過度投資與投資不足等逆選擇的發生機會。故本研究欲探討分析師對於企業投資總額之關聯性，並且進一步探討分析師與企業過度投資及投資不足之關聯性。以2010年到2013年之台灣上市櫃公司做為樣本。實證結果發現，分析師是否追隨與企業投資總額沒有顯著之關聯性，而過度投資之公司其投資總額與分析師之預測錯誤率與離散度呈現正相關。

近年來國際間財報不實的醜聞時有所聞，使得投資人及社會大眾對公開資訊的正確性高度缺乏信任。無獨有偶，台灣地區的企業也因資訊不透明而使得投資人對企業財務報表之數字能否代表實際經營成果也產生懷疑，某些企業甚至隱瞞財報問題而導致投資人虧損，因此各界要求企業真實揭露經營狀況之呼籲不絶於耳，對公司治理及會計規範的探究也日益熱烈，資訊透明度的議題於是在國內、外均成為眾人高度關注的焦點。 眾所週知，金融機構在一國經濟發展中扮演至為關鍵的角色，也因其性質之特殊性，一旦發生問題，容易發生系統性之危機。因此，為避免金融機構經營資訊不透明而使投資人受到損失，各國監理機關均制定與資訊揭露相關之法規，期望金融機構在資訊充分揭露之情況之下經營，以達到金融穩定的目的。 然而回顧過往的相關文獻，有關資訊透明度的議題多數聚焦於上市公司之資訊揭露對經營績效或公司價值之影響層面來作探究，針對金融機構中之金融控股公司年報資訊透明度決定因素之研究，則較少受到關注。因此，本文以年報揭露之內容作為衡量資訊透明度之標的，採用2002年至2006年台灣14家金融控股公司之追蹤資料並搭配固定效果模型探討以下問題：（1）分析與了解金融控股公司資訊揭露之情形（2）以實證模型探討金融控股公司年報資訊透明度之決定因素。（3）提供監理機關修改「金融控股公司年報應行記載事項準則」揭露事項之參考及提出相關之政策建議，以利金融監理之需要。 本文以證基會之評鑑指標為基礎，對金融控股公司年報資訊揭露評鑑結果發現，金融控股公司之年報資訊揭露平均而言尚具改進空間，且各公司間存在極大差異；而實證結果顯示（1）在內部股權因素方面，經理人持股比例與年報資訊透明度呈現顯著之正相關。（2）在公司特性因素方面，本文發現公司規模係數為顯著負值，顯示金融控股公司之規模較小者，年報資訊透明度較佳。（3）在外部人持股因素方面，本國投信基金持股比例與年報資訊透明度呈現顯著之負向關聯。（4）在時間變數上，年報之資訊揭露隨著時間之遞移而逐步改善，二者呈現顯著的正相關。 / Financial reporting and information disclosure are important means for financial institutions to communicate their performances to investors. However, a series of accounting frauds shook public confidence in the reliability of financial statements. In response, people began to ask enterprises to disclose information truly and to enhance corporate governance and accounting controls. Everyone knows financial institutions play key roles in economic activities. Once failure, financial institutions will tend to cause system crisis easily. To prevent such failure from occurring and to disclose information of financial institutions to public are the responsibilities of supervisory authority. The purpose of this study are as follows:（1）to understand the status quo of annual reporting transparency in Taiwanese Financial Holding Companies.（2）to investigate the decisive factors that influence the annual reporting transparency.（3）to provide policy implications to the Financial Supervisory Commission on the amendments in Company Act and Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for Financial Holding Companies. This study uses the fixed-effect model with a panel data of Taiwanese Financial Holding Companies for the period of 2002-2006.Using Securities and Futures Institute’s “Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System’s Index” as a measure of transparency, we find that the information transparency across firms varies significantly and that the financial holding companies that have higher ranking in disclosure tend to be smaller in terms of total assets, have lower institutional ownership and higher managerial ownership. This study also shows that the transparency in Taiwanese financial holding companies disclosure has gradually improved in recent years.

本研究以2002年至2005年之上市公司為研究對象，衡量2002與2004年兩年之年報資訊揭露水準，探討資訊揭露水準與機構投資人持股兩者間之關係，並分析兩期資訊透明度與機構投資人持股比率的改變對經營績效與公司價值變動的影響。 實證結果發現，機構投資人持股意願受到前期年報資訊揭露水準高低的影響，顯示資訊揭露水準為機構投資人之選股決策因素之一。前期年報資訊揭露水準愈佳，機構投資人持股比率愈高，但當期資訊揭露程度對同期機構投資人持股意願則無顯著影響。此外，機構投資人持股比率高低與公司同期或次期資訊揭露程度皆無顯著關聯性。企業資訊揭露水準之改善與機構投資人持股比率增加皆與公司經營績效及公司價值之提升呈顯著正相關。 / Based on a sample of firms listed on Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 2002 to 2005, this study first examines the relationship between the information transparency, measured the disclosure level of annual reports, and shareholdings of institutional investors. In addition, this study investigates the influence of increase in the level of disclosure transparency and shareholdings on performance and firm value. The empirical results suggest that firms with higher disclosure level are associated with greater institutional ownership next year, but the same relationship didn’t hold for concurrent period. This finding suggests that disclosure level of annual report is considered by the institutional investors when making their investment decisions. The findings also indicate that improvement in disclosure level and increase in institutional investors’ shareholdings not only enhances the operating performance but also the firm value.

本文主要目的在探討當天氣（雲量及氣溫）、日照小時數以及會影響人們生理週期（如睡眠型態的改變）的日光節約制等外在環境因素引發投資人情緒變化時，是否會影響各國投資人對公司會計盈餘宣告資訊之解讀與反應，且是否會因為公司盈餘宣告所傳遞的為好消息或壞消息而不同。此外，本文亦進一步檢視在不同國家層級的機制背景所塑造出的不同資訊環境（例如財務透明度高低以及成文法系或不成文法系）下，上述氣候效應是否存在差異性。 / 由於心理學文獻指出，一些外在環境因素會引發投資人的情緒反應，而投資人情緒又會影響其對資訊的處理過程以及風險趨避程度，另一方面，行為財務學文獻則指出投資人情緒會影響其對公司資訊之解讀，因此本文以跨洲及跨緯度共25國於1990年至2006年間共169,177筆的公司季盈餘宣告為樣本分析此現象。整體而言，本研究發現氣候等外在環境因素所引發的投資人情緒確實會影響其對公司盈餘宣告資訊之解讀；且當公司盈餘宣告傳遞的為好消息時，投資人因雲量較少、氣溫較低、日照小時數較長或未受到日光節約制影響而心情比較好時，會促使對未來較為樂觀且對資訊的處理較為隨意，故對於好消息的反應更為正面，但若處於較差的心情時，則對未來比較悲觀且處理資訊相對嚴謹，因此會比較保守地看待好消息而減少原本對好消息應有的正向反應。相對地，上述外在環境因素對公司盈餘宣告壞消息的影響則相反。 / 最後，由於本研究未發現任何外在環境因素所引發的投資人情緒對公司盈餘宣告資訊的反應存在明顯的緯度或地區等地理上的趨勢，因而嘗試由制度環境面加以解釋上述現象，亦即探討資訊環境的完善度是否會影響氣候效應的差異性。本文發現當國家層級的法律制度等機制背景使得其股市發展程度較高且財務資訊較多較可靠時，投資人更能透過公司的資訊揭露取得瞭解公司經營狀況的真實資訊，其所要考量的投資決策之複雜性、風險及未來不確定性確實較低，因此資訊環境較完善（高財務透明度或為不成文法系）的國家，其投資人對公司盈餘資訊宣告的反應受氣候等相關因素影響之程度較小。

本論文以國內1997-2006年之上市櫃集團為研究對象，探討集團企業內相互轉投資所造成的市值高估現象及其對公司價值的影響，並深入各集團分子企業探討不同轉投資標的對公司價值之影響。實證結果顯示集團企業內各分子企業相互轉投資的確造成集團市值高估之現象，而投資人對於該現象，給予集團企業整體負向評價。此外，就集團內各分子企業而言，轉投資於上市櫃公司由於資訊透明度相較於轉投資於非上市櫃公司為佳，故對於公司價值負面影響較不嚴重；而轉投資於集團內其他分子企業相較於投資集團外企業，由於關係企業間之交易揭露仍不透明，操縱可能性較高，故對於公司價值呈負面影響，後兩者實證研究都再次證明資訊透明度與公司價值間之正向關係。 / This study explores the double counting effect and the relationship between that effect and the corporate value resulting from cross-holding among firms in a conglomerate, and also explores the relationship between different type of investing objects and the corporate value by using a sample of companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter during 1997-2006. Our empirical analysis indicates that cross-holdings among firms in a conglomerate resulted in overvaluation of the group, and investors responded to them negatively. In addition, member companies in the conglomerate investing in companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange or Over the Counter did not so negatively influence the corporate value as compared to investing in companies not listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter mainly because of the information transparency. Furthermore, the information among conglomerate trading is still opaque and the possibility of manipulation is higher, so investment within the conglomerate as compared to outside companies has negative impact on corporate value. The above findings both proved a positive relationship between information transparency and corporate value.

自去年金融海嘯爆發，許多公司雖然經營績效不佳，其管理階層卻坐領高薪，經過媒體的大幅報導，使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓與黃金降落傘之現象。針對上述不合理的現象，投資大眾期能藉由公司所揭露的訊息，瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬之間是否具有合理的關係，並進行必要之監督。此外，股東行動主義逐漸抬頭，投資大眾可利用企業所揭露之資訊判斷公司大小情事，其中包括是否存在著公司經營不善，董監事卻溢領高薪的情況。另一方面，坐領高薪之管理階層為避免引起眾怒，可能會減少資訊之數量及降低資訊之品質，以減低其領取不合理之酬勞而引發社會譁然之機率。因此，本研究之目的在於探討公司董監酬勞與資訊揭露透明度之關聯性，並藉由實證資料驗證我國企業是否存在著此種規避資訊揭露之現象。 本研究實證結果顯示，董監事為了確保其本身之利益，而維持高額之董監酬勞時，可能增加董監事與管理階層合謀之機會，而共同隱藏不利之訊息，降低其資訊揭露透明度。此外，董監酬勞占公司淨利之比例增加時，董監事個人利益與公司營運成敗的關係愈密切，而影響董監事之獨立性。換言之，董監酬勞占淨利比較高之公司較會隱藏對其不利之訊息，使得該公司資訊揭露透明度降低。再者，公司董監酬勞異常高於同業平均值時，會促使董監事隱藏與董監酬勞相關之資訊，減少其資訊揭露之數量與品質，而降低其資訊揭露透明度。 / Since the global financial tsunami broke out in 2008, many corporations have performed poorly, but their top management still receives high compensations. Through the reports in news media, people become more concerned with the unreasonable phenomenon of corporate “Fat Cat” and “Golden Parachute”. Investors are paying more attention to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between corporate performance and directors’ compensations and to perform necessary monitoring. On the other hand, directors who receive high salaries may reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed to avoid public scrutiny and criticism. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between directors’ compensations and corporate information transparency. The empirical results show that for the directors and supervisors to maintain their high compensation, they may collude with the management in hiding negative information and reducing corporate information transparency. In addition, when directors’ compensations were abnormally higher than the industry average, they had a tendency to hide the compensation information or reduce the quantity and quality of information disclosed. Consequently, these corporations had lower information transparency.