知識經濟 (Knowledge-based Economy) 時代，創造公司高價值的不再是有形資產，而是無形的如識與智慧資本。大多數成功的公司，是能妥善並迅速利用其無形資產的公司。因此，為達到企業永續經營、提升產業競爭力之目的，智慧資本之創造、管理、衡量及評價，將是重要關鍵。 Klock & Megna (2000) 研究發現美國無線通訊產業的Tobin’s q值平均為10.8，高於其他產業。其範圍從4.2到25.6，所以本研究亦針對台灣的電信相關產業進行研究。研究發現為台灣的電信相關產業之Tobin’s q值並沒有特別高於其他產業。但本研究發現員工每人現金紅利以及每人紅利轉增資與Tobin’s q值為正相關；而每人薪資與Tobin’s q值為負相關。 所以對於台灣企業發展出以下建議：1. 應做好知識管理：將員工所擁有的知識留在組織中，成為結構資本。2. 對於員工獎勵的部分：是否可考慮改採股票選擇權的方式或朝向營造一個良好的工作環境與組織文化的方式以留住員工。3. 從事創新性研發：從事創新性研發才能累積智慧資本。

公司在追求規模經濟的同時，由於其所有者的時間精力有限，就必須放釋放一定的代理權，以求得企業的規模發展。當代理權釋出後，代理關係就無可避免，利害關係衝突於是產生。代理人會傾向偷懶、保守、自利、短視，以維護自己的利益，引發了所謂的代理成本，於是便需要公司治理機制加以解決。本研究除了繼續以前的研究探討我國上市電子公司之股權結構及董監酬勞與員工分紅對公司績效的影響外，由於我國高科技業的「員工分紅配股」措施，使公司的股本增大，造成其EPS降低、股價的稀釋及選舉權受到侵蝕，因而損害原股東的權益。因此，本研究也欲探討我國上市電子公司股權結構是否會影響其董監酬勞及員工分紅政策。 本研究以1997起至2002年止台灣上市電子公司為樣本，經刪除資料不完整的公司後，共計有55家公司330個觀察值為研究樣本。本研究是以複迴歸模型來進行實證研究。實證結果顯示經理人持股比率、機構法人持股比率、董事監察人持股比率，以及員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率與公司績效呈正相關。經理人持股比率及機構投資者持股比率與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率呈正相關，至於董事持股比率、監察人持股比率及監察人佔全部董事監察人比率，則與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率無關。 / When the size of the company is growing, the owners of the company have the limit time and the energy, the company must have the agent. Once the company has the agent, the interest relationship among the owner and agent will conflict. The agents are easily lazy, conservative, selfish, and nearsighted to pursue their interest, so the agent cost happen. This study beside continue the former research about the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance, and the relationship between the the the employee bonus and the company performance in the TSE-listed electronic company. Because the high-tech company in Taiwan practice the policy of “the employee stock distribution”, the policy will cause the expansion of the stock. The expansion of the stock lessens the EPS, dilutes the stock price and erodes the right of the election. That damage the right of the original stockholders, and therefore this study examine the relationship between the ownership structure and the employee bonus in the TSE-listed electronic company as well. This study samples are the TSE-listed electronic company from 1997 to 2002, but exclude the company with insufficient data. The rest are 55 companies, and 330 observations that are obtained. This study uses complex regression model on this empirical research. The empirical result indicates the stock ownership of the managers, the stock ownership of the institution investors, the stock ownership of the board, and the bonus rate of the employee are positively related to the company performance. The stock ownership of the manager, and the stock ownership of the institution investors are positively related to the employee bonus rate. The stock ownership of the directors, the stock ownership of the supervisors, and the supervisor rate of the board reveal no significant relationship with the bonus rate of the employee.

公司的順利有效運作仰賴企業整體共同努力，透過發放以公司績效為計算基礎的酬勞及紅利，期望能增加董監與員工的工作動機，進而達到提升公司績效之目的。然而，我國於費用化制度實施前，董監酬勞與員工紅利之會計處理係作為盈餘分配項，而非列為薪資費用，此作法受到外資及投資法人的批評，認為台灣企業的財務報表無法允當表達其實質經營狀況。為消除相關人士的抨擊，並與國際會計準則接軌，我國陸續修訂法律、頒布公報及解釋函令，規定自2008年1月1日起，員工分紅及董監酬勞費用化制度正式開始實施。 本研究欲探討在費用化制度實施後，公司的酬勞及紅利制度將產生什麼變化，且該項制度的變動是否會改變對董監及員工的激勵誘因，進而影響公司績效。本研究實證結果顯示，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，公司發放的董監酬勞佔稅後淨利比例無顯著變化。在員工紅利部分，現金紅利比重提高，股票紅利比重則降低。無論於費用化制度實施前或後，給予員工現金或股票紅利，皆有助於公司提升經營績效；惟費用化後，現金紅利之激勵效果變差，股票紅利則變好。此外，若同時比較員工現金與股票紅利兩者，可發現無論是費用化實施前或實施後，現金紅利對於提升公司經營績效之效果皆較佳。 / The success of corporate operations relies on the efforts of all people in the firm. By distributing compensation and bonus which are based on corporate performance, it not only can enhance directors’ and employees’ work motivation, but also achieve the purpose of better corporate performance. The accounting treatment for director compensation or employee bonus used to be recognized as a part of corporate earnings distribution, not as an expense. This method was, however, criticized for its failure to present the true operating results of a company. In order to solve this problem and in accordance with the IFRS treatment, the government amended the related laws and required that both director compensation and employee bonus be recognized as salary expense after January 1, 2008. The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in director compensation and employee bonus after the above new regulation took effect. This study also examines whether this change alters the incentives to directors and employees. The empirical results show that after the new accounting treatment, no significant changes in the percentage of director compensation to net income. When it comes to employee bonus, the percentage of cash bonus increased, but the stock bonus declined. In addition, employee cash and stock bonus, no matter being treated as an expense or not, did help the firms to enhance performance. However, cash bonus’ motivation effect became lesser, whereas stock bonus’ effect increased. Furthermore, cash bonus was more effective than stock bonus in improving corporate performance before and after the expense treatment for employee bonus.

2008年1月1日起員工分紅之會計處理，將與IFRS國際財務報告準則接軌，即員工分紅不再是盈餘分配，而是作為當期的費用；此外，公司以股票作為員工獎酬，原則上亦須以公平價值衡量，並以費用認列入帳。預計此一會計處理之變革，將對公司、股東及員工均產生重大衝擊。而公司為減緩這些衝擊，會產生何種因應措施，即為本研究探討之對象。 由於太陽能產業在近兩三年之EPS及股價高漲。因股價為影響股票獎酬的重要因素之一，因此受員工分紅費用化之衝擊較大，故選擇兩家太陽能電池之上櫃公司為分析及訪談研究之對象，係因獎酬制度的變革對其影響較可明顯觀察。 獎酬員工之態樣甚多，經訪談兩家樣本公司後，兩家公司之管理當局均不希望政策的改變對公司的EPS造成太大的影響，然以2006年度為例，在維持員工原獲配股數不變的假設下，設算修法後對兩家公司在獲利方面分別下降了32%及15%，股東所得亦呈等額下降，員工個人綜合所得稅總稅負有可能最高分別增加161,893千元及29,383千元；而在公司分配之帳列盈餘不變的假設下，兩家公司之EPS分別減少1.5元及0.5元，股東所得降幅分別為9％及3％，員工總所得減少輻度分別為97.2%及97.4%。綜上可見在不做任何因應的情形下，其對樣本公司的EPS影響甚鉅，故兩家樣本公司勢必在此間尋求一個均衡點，修正其目前的獎酬措施，即可能會降低股票的分配比例，相對增加現金分紅的比例。 又以2005年度兩家公司員工紅利實際分配之情形分析，兩家公司員工紅利配股中分別有27％及44％，分配給公司重要管理當局，所以在此波獎酬制度的變格中，公司的管理當局也是重要的受衝擊者。另董事會及高階經理人通常是公司擬訂員工獎酬計畫的重要決策者，如公司利益與其個人利益相衝突時，是否會影響其決定員工獎酬制度的獨立性，是值得深入探討的問題。 在考量各獎酬制度之特性後，及分析整理員工分紅費用化及適用39號公報對個案公司之影響，本研究彙總結論如下: 一、公司應設算決定固定的員工分紅比例，以免超過公司章程所訂定的配比，同時可控制此對公司EPS的衝擊。 二、降低分紅配股之比重，增加現金股利之比重。 三、透過發放現金及發行員工認股權憑證或限制性股票方式，取代部分員工分紅配股。 四、在公司股價較低的時候買回庫藏股再轉讓給員工，以減少對原股東權益的稀釋程度。 本研究對實務提出下列建議： 一、法令規定員工分紅費用化後，應依費用性質列於營業成本或營業費用項下，惟該費用之估列時點與實際員工分紅分配時點可能差距一年半載，其費用性質分類如涉及有資本化之問題時，是否有操弄損益的空間？建議法令規定有更明確之規範。 二、公司的管理當局，尤其是董事會及高階經理人，為擬訂公司員工獎酬制度重要的決策者。在多數董事又身兼公司重要職務的情形下，為避免董事個人與公司、員工或股東的利益相衝突，建議應制訂法令，規範兼任員工之董事於擬訂公司員工獎酬制度時，應予利益迴避，或委由獨立董事來代表研討及擬訂新的員工獎酬制度。 三、39號公報的適用屬估計變動或會計原則變動，依目前對外公告的39號公報版本看，以估計變動的方式來處理，即不追溯調整以前年度的財務報表，此規範適切與否值得探討。 / In order to converge with International Financial Reporting Standard, the accounting treatment for distribution of employee bonus should be considered as current expense and not be deemed as part of earnings distribution starting from January 1, 2008. Besides, share compensation also has to be recognized as current expense using it’s fair value to measurement. This accounting process changed will result in significant impact on the enterprise, shareholders and employee. This study will discuss what kind of approach might be adopted by those enterprises to mitigate this huge challenge. The EPS and share price for those solar energy related industry are increasing dramatically recently. This study decided to select two solar cell IPO companies as sample to interview and analysis the impact on employee compensation scheme changed, due to the impact will be more observable compare with other industries. There are variety types of employee compensation programs. After interviewed, the management of these two sample companies stated that they are not expecting to impact the company’s EPS significantly. By using these two sample companies’ 2006 financial figures as a base, to understand the effect after amendment of the regulation. Under the assumption of non-amended employees’ distributed shares recalculating