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Concepts and nativism

Jerry Fodor has argued that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. I argue against this position, but not, as other have done, on the grounds that the arguments against lexical decomposition upon which Fodor relies are flawed. Rather, I argue that even if lexical concepts cannot be decomposed, the possession conditions for having lexical concepts are nonetheless not innately satisfied.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.35554
Date January 2000
CreatorsAdamson, Nicholas.
ContributorsMcGilvray, Jim (advisor), Pietroski, Paul (advisor)
PublisherMcGill University
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
CoverageDoctor of Philosophy (Department of Philosophy.)
RightsAll items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
Relationalephsysno: 001763822, proquestno: NQ64492, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.

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