本文旨在探討投資人情緒與法人說明會之關聯性，即公司如何經由召開法人說明會，策略性地回應投資人情緒反應，以企圖影響情緒所導致的預期偏差。實證發現：管理當局策略性地改變其自願性揭露政策，以反映投資人情緒。當投資人情緒愈低落時，公司將傾向於召開法人說明會，且公司召開法人說明會之頻率亦會增加。相反的，當投資人情緒高昂時，公司則愈不會召開法人說明會。再者，當投資人情緒愈低落時，法人說明會所揭露之公司資訊將愈樂觀。此研究亦顯示公司自願性揭露政策的選擇，反映管理當局渴望維持樂觀之評價。 / In this paper we explore the association between investor sentiment and the likelihood of holding conference calls. In other words, this paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their conference calls in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biases in expectations. We show that managers strategically vary their voluntary disclosure policies in response to prevailing sentiment. We find that during low-sentiment periods, the firms are more likely to conduct conference calls and conduct them more frequently; while during periods of high sentiment they decrease the frequency of conference calls. In addition, during low-sentiment periods, the conference calls disclose more optimistic information. Overall, this study provides evidence that company’s voluntary disclosure choices reflect managers desire to maintain optimistic valuations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0973530061 |
| Creators | 吳博翀, Wu, Po Chung |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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