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Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Submitted by Amal Nait Hammou (amal.naithammou@gmail.com) on 2014-07-24T13:33:37Z
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Previous issue date: 2014-07-15 / Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts. / A parceria público-privada é um novo modelo contratual institucionalizado em 2004 que pode ser usado para remediar o déficit em infra-estrutura no Brasil. No contexto de uma relação principal-agente, o objetivo do parceiro público é dar incentivos contratuais ao parceiro privado para que os interesses de ambossejam alinhados. Essa pesquisa qualitativa apresenta os resultados de um estudo empírico que examina o desempenho dos contratos de PPPS com incentivos no Brasil no setor das rodovias. O objetivo é explicar como os contratados podem alinhar seus interesses num ambiente de informação assimétrica. Literatura identificou os fatores que podem influenciar o desenho das PPPs e dos contratos com incentivos eficientes. Esse estudo avalia a contribuição desses fatores no desenho dos contratos de PPPs focando no caso do primeiro e único contrato PPP assinado no setor de rodovias no Brasil, o PPP MG- 050. O primeiro passo é descrever a condição da rede de rodovias no Brasil e o nível de cumprimento do parceiro privado com o contrato PPP MG-050. O segundo passo é explicar o desempenho do parceiro privado e concluir se os interesses dos dois parceiros foram alinhados em aspectos contratuais.Com base nesses resultados e na análise do contrato, o estudo formula sugestões para melhorar o desenho dos contratos de PPPs apoiando-se na teoria dos incentivos em contratos.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/11886
Date15 July 2014
CreatorsNait Hammou, Amal
ContributorsGoldbaum, Sergio, Turolla, Frederico Araujo, Escolas::EAESP, Pacheco, Julia Alice Sophia von Maltzan
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Sourcereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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