<p>This
dissertation examines the implications of digitization for firm corporate
strategy and organizational governance. I aim to link together emerging
research on platform businesses and classic corporate strategy research on firm
scale, scope and organization, two important streams of work that have remained
largely independent despite the close connection between them. To do so, my
dissertation revolves around the following central question: How can platform
owners leverage governance mechanisms to alleviate market frictions, and what
are the performance outcomes? </p><p><br></p>
<p>In the first chapter, using
game-theoretic formal models, I analyze how long standing information frictions
are alleviated by digital platforms through developing capabilities for solving
these information problems and exploiting synergies between those capabilities.
In the second chapter, using data from online peer-to-peer lending, I show that
platform owners can mitigate problems of information asymmetry in platform
markets and enhance market effectiveness through allocation of key decision
rights among participants. Finally, in the third chapter, using data from
mobile apps, I show that platform gatekeeping serves as a screening mechanism
for platform owners and how it can shape the different ways app
developers profit from innovation. </p><p><br></p><p>Collectively, my dissertation aims to advance corporate strategy
research in two ways. First, my research broadens the application of theories
of organizational governance core to corporate strategy to a new organizational
form – platforms – and I show that core tenets of the theories still apply,
although the specific empirical mechanisms might take a different form in the
platform context (e.g., decision rights allocated between the platform owner
and complementors, rather than between the corporate office and business
units). Second, my research stands to expand existing theories in corporate
strategy through a sharp focus on organization and governance features that are
unique to platforms – such as by studying the orchestrating role of the
platform owner (e.g., through gatekeeping, platform owner can control
complementors' platform access and shape their value-creation activities on the
platform), and the multi-layer relationships prevalent in platforms (e.g.,
relationships between the platform owner and complementors, between
complementors on the same side, and between complementors across two or more
sides).</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/15032046 |
| Date | 22 July 2021 |
| Creators | Anparasan Mahalingam (6922799) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Corporate_Strategies_of_Digital_Organizations/15032046 |
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