Thesis advisor: Matteo Iacoviello / This thesis focuses on investment, regulation and labor market frictions. The first paper is motivated by lumpiness of investment activity at the plant level. Investment episodes at firm level happen in lumps, period of great activity and periods of inaction. Previous research has suggested that, in a general equilibrium framework, accounting for such microeconomic behavior is irrelevant for explaining aggregate investment (Thomas (2002)). This paper re-evaluates previous findings in a two-sector economy, where non-convex costs of capital adjustment apply to each sector. Calibrating the model to be consistent with microeconomic evidence, I find that lumpy investment is relevant for the business cycle. Through limited intersectoral mobility of capital, non-convex capital adjustment costs impact the relative price of investment generating a synchronization of investment decisions at sectoral level. As a result, aggregate investment is amplified relative to neoclassical benchmarks in response to an aggregate productivity shock. In a one-sector model this mechanism is absent, since intersectoral capital mobility is perfect and the relative price of investment is independent from non-convex capital adjustment costs. In an empirical investigation of the model using 2-digit SIC industry data, I find evidence that sectoral measures of capital distribution forecast aggregate investment. The second paper investigates the effect of product market liberalization on employment and considers possible interactions between policies and institutions in product and labor markets. Using panel data for OECD countries over the period 1980-2002, we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labor market regulation is high. The data also suggest that product market deregulation promotes labor market deregulation. These results are consistent with the basic predictions of a standard bargaining model, such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), extended to allow for a richer specification of the fall back position of the union. In the third paper, we start from evidence that most countries in the Euro Area are characterized by high product (PMR) and labor market (LMR) regulation. We then study long and short to medium run macroeconomic effects of reforming PMR and LMR by developing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring endogenous producers entry and labor market frictions. We show that lowering PMR would increase steady state employment, wages and GDP but aggregate consumption would drop in the aftermath of the reform. Deregulating labor markets presents a less significant intertemporal trade off. Lower unemployment benefits would increase employment and GDP but reduce wages both in the short and long run. Smaller firing costs would trigger a positive effect on producers entry on impact, but employment and GDP would be negatively affected as time passes by. Regulation has also consequences for the business cycles properties of the economy. Lower barriers to entry and smaller unemployment benefits tend to smooth out aggregate fluctuations, while firing costs have a reverse effect. With a counterfactual exercise, we show that if the Euro Area would deregulate both product and labor markets at the US level it would adjust differently to aggregate shocks. A more flexible Euro Area would be more responsive to exogenous disturbances and the reversion to the steady state would be quicker. Our findings point out that concerns about the negative effect of strict regulation for the speed of recovery from downturns could be well placed, consistently with the idea that the European economy might be dynamically sclerotic. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

This dissertation studies the impact of several different housing market features on the macroeconomy. Chapter 1 augments the New-Keynesian model with collateral constraints to incorporate long-term debt in order to examine the interaction between multi-period loans, leverage, and indeterminacy. Allowing firms to borrow heavily against commercial housing by increasing the loan-to-value ratio from 0.01 to 0.90 reduces the level of steady state output approximately 3.19% and decreases social welfare. In contrast, increasing the debt limit of households increases steady state output by 2.72%. Social welfare is maximized under a utilitiarian function when households can borrow at a loan-to-value ratio of about 0.49. An economy with long-term debt also makes stabilization much more difficult for monetary policymakers because determinacy is harder to attain. Instead of only having to satisfy the Taylor Principle (which implies that a more than one-to-one response to inflation), central bankers must either use a strict inflation target or aggressively respond to inflation and the output gap to ensure determinacy. Chapter 2 examine a New-Keynesian model with housing where default occurs if housing prices are sufficiently low, resulting in a loss of access to credit and housing markets. Default decreases aggregate and patient household consumption, increases impatient household consumption, and amplifies the decline in housing prices due to a misallocation of housing. The effects on consumption often peak immediately before default occurs. Policies that prevent underwater borrowing or raise interest rates along with housing prices are generally desirable because they increase utilitarian social welfare. This paper shows that default is not simply a symptom of economic downturns, but a cause. Chapter 3 explores the correlation between the home mortgage interest deduction (HMID) and state economic growth. The HMID was introduced to incentivize home purchases by distorting the after-tax price, resulting in an overinvestment in real estate. Previous empirical work has shown that investment in physical capital increases economic growth more so than investment in structures. Theoretically, the anticipated effect of the HMID would be lower subsequent economic growth. However, this paper finds that residential housing is actually beneficial for economic growth.

Dado o recente cenário econômico brasileiro, caracterizado por incertezas políticas e instabilidades econômicas, é essencial que as empresas engajem uma política de hedge, como parte de sua política financeira, com o objetivo de evitar que seus resultados sejam afetados por fricções de mercado. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo verificar o impacto da política de hedge sobre os custos de agência das empresas brasileiras. Os resultados obtidos foram de encontro com a literatura sobre hedge e custos de agência, foi encontrado que quanto maior a utilização do hedge, menor são os custos de agência enfrentados pelos acionistas. Essa relação demonstra que ao engajar a utilização do hedge na política financeira da empresa, o gestor passa a minimizar os impactos das fricções de mercado, e reduz as perdas residuais que os acionistas sofreriam em suas riquezas, caso o gestor não engajasse a política. Ainda, conforme sugerido por Dadalt, Gay e Nam (2002), outro benefício encontrado nesse resultado, é que ao reduzir os impactos das fricções de mercado nos lucros da empresa, o gestor informa aos stakeholders, um lucro que demonstra melhor a performance da companhia, assim credores e investidores podem tomar melhores decisões referentes aos contratos com a empresa, com base em um lucro que contém menor informação assimétrica. Dessa forma, a utilização da política de hedge pode aliviar problemas relacionadas a seleção adversa entre a empresa e seus stakeholders / Given the recent Brazilian economic scenario, characterized by political uncertainties and economic instabilities, it is essential that companies engage in a hedge policy as part of their financial policy, in order to prevent their results from being affected by market frictions. In this context, the present study aimed to verify the impact of the hedge policy on the agency costs of Brazilian companies. The results obtained were in agreement with the literature on hedge and agency costs, it was found that the greater the use of hedge, the lower the agency costs faced by the shareholders. This relationship demonstrates that by engaging the use of hedge in the company\'s financial policy, the manager starts to minimize the impacts of market frictions and reduces the residual losses that shareholders would suffer in their wealth if the manager did not engage the policy. As suggested by Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002), another benefit found in this result is that by reducing the impacts of market frictions on company profits, the manager informs stakeholders of a profit that best demonstrates the performance of the company, so creditors and investors can make better decisions regarding contracts with the company, based on a profit that contains less asymmetric information. In this way, the use of the hedge policy can alleviate problems related to adverse selection between the company and its stakeholders.

Dado o recente cenário econômico brasileiro, caracterizado por incertezas políticas e instabilidades econômicas, é essencial que as empresas engajem uma política de hedge, como parte de sua política financeira, com o objetivo de evitar que seus resultados sejam afetados por fricções de mercado. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo verificar o impacto da política de hedge sobre os custos de agência das empresas brasileiras. Os resultados obtidos foram de encontro com a literatura sobre hedge e custos de agência, foi encontrado que quanto maior a utilização do hedge, menor são os custos de agência enfrentados pelos acionistas. Essa relação demonstra que ao engajar a utilização do hedge na política financeira da empresa, o gestor passa a minimizar os impactos das fricções de mercado, e reduz as perdas residuais que os acionistas sofreriam em suas riquezas, caso o gestor não engajasse a política. Ainda, conforme sugerido por Dadalt, Gay e Nam (2002), outro benefício encontrado nesse resultado, é que ao reduzir os impactos das fricções de mercado nos lucros da empresa, o gestor informa aos stakeholders, um lucro que demonstra melhor a performance da companhia, assim credores e investidores podem tomar melhores decisões referentes aos contratos com a empresa, com base em um lucro que contém menor informação assimétrica. Dessa forma, a utilização da política de hedge pode aliviar problemas relacionadas a seleção adversa entre a empresa e seus stakeholders / Given the recent Brazilian economic scenario, characterized by political uncertainties and economic instabilities, it is essential that companies engage in a hedge policy as part of their financial policy, in order to prevent their results from being affected by market frictions. In this context, the present study aimed to verify the impact of the hedge policy on the agency costs of Brazilian companies. The results obtained were in agreement with the literature on hedge and agency costs, it was found that the greater the use of hedge, the lower the agency costs faced by the shareholders. This relationship demonstrates that by engaging the use of hedge in the company\'s financial policy, the manager starts to minimize the impacts of market frictions and reduces the residual losses that shareholders would suffer in their wealth if the manager did not engage the policy. As suggested by Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002), another benefit found in this result is that by reducing the impacts of market frictions on company profits, the manager informs stakeholders of a profit that best demonstrates the performance of the company, so creditors and investors can make better decisions regarding contracts with the company, based on a profit that contains less asymmetric information. In this way, the use of the hedge policy can alleviate problems related to adverse selection between the company and its stakeholders.

Digital platforms are increasingly disrupting established status quos in traditionally stable markets. This study focuses on the launch and use of a digital service platform in the construction industry in  Finland. The study encompasses a practical, action research case study of the platform itself and the context in which it exists. In order to clearly describe observed phenomena from the case, we utilise well-established concepts both from the field of economics and information systems to utilise a relevant vocabulary for describing the findings. The purpose is to answer our research question: what are the perceived market frictions for Small and Medium-sized Entreprises within the construction industry affecting networking and contracting? Also, in what ways can digital platforms mitigate these frictions? The study identifies several underlying frictions in the industry relating to network saturation, disintermediation, transaction costs and relate these to the functionality of the platform attempting to alleviate these frictions.

<p>This dissertation examines the implications of digitization for firm corporate strategy and organizational governance. I aim to link together emerging research on platform businesses and classic corporate strategy research on firm scale, scope and organization, two important streams of work that have remained largely independent despite the close connection between them. To do so, my dissertation revolves around the following central question: How can platform owners leverage governance mechanisms to alleviate market frictions, and what are the performance outcomes? </p><p><br></p> <p>In the first chapter, using game-theoretic formal models, I analyze how long standing information frictions are alleviated by digital platforms through developing capabilities for solving these information problems and exploiting synergies between those capabilities. In the second chapter, using data from online peer-to-peer lending, I show that platform owners can mitigate problems of information asymmetry in platform markets and enhance market effectiveness through allocation of key decision rights among participants. Finally, in the third chapter, using data from mobile apps, I show that platform gatekeeping serves as a screening mechanism for platform owners and how it can shape the different ways app developers profit from innovation. </p><p><br></p><p>Collectively, my dissertation aims to advance corporate strategy research in two ways. First, my research broadens the application of theories of organizational governance core to corporate strategy to a new organizational form – platforms – and I show that core tenets of the theories still apply, although the specific empirical mechanisms might take a different form in the platform context (e.g., decision rights allocated between the platform owner and complementors, rather than between the corporate office and business units). Second, my research stands to expand existing theories in corporate strategy through a sharp focus on organization and governance features that are unique to platforms – such as by studying the orchestrating role of the platform owner (e.g., through gatekeeping, platform owner can control complementors' platform access and shape their value-creation activities on the platform), and the multi-layer relationships prevalent in platforms (e.g., relationships between the platform owner and complementors, between complementors on the same side, and between complementors across two or more sides).</p>

The weight of real estate in a multi-asset portfolio is a highly discussed matter and the main purpose for every investor is to reach an optimal diversification. The aim of the thesis is to apply a new allocation model, which considers market imperfections characterized by real estate. The most known and used method today is the mean-variance approach, founded in the modern portfolio theory. Modern portfolio theory is based on several assumptions, where one of these is the assumption of an efficient market. However, real estate is not considered the be a part of the efficient market due to several market imperfections, such as illiquidity, transaction cost etc. Market imperfection generate risk, which naturally should decrease the optimal weight of real estate in the portfolio. In order to assess optimal real estate allocation in a multi-asset portfolio when accounting for market imperfections an extended approach of the mean-variance model is applied. The extended model accounts for risk-aversion, transaction cost and time-on-market. The model is divided in two approaches, the benchmark- and normative approach, based on two different papers. The model is tested on the Swedish market with current market conditions in order to assess the models applicability. The result from the benchmark approach suggested an optimal real estate allocation of 0,72 –  5,84 %. The normative approach has been dismissed as inconclusive and unreliable due to abnormal weight of real estate. However, the value of risk-aversion is identified as the strongest determinant in both the models.  The allocation from the benchmark approach is, as expected, lower than results of the standard mean-variance approach. The extended model is a useful and valid tool in the consideration of market imperfections characterized by real estate. / Vikten av fastigheter i en portfölj med fler tillgångsslag är en omdiskuterad fråga där det huvudsakliga målet för en investerare är att uppnå en optimal diversifiering. Målet med uppsatsen är att testa en ny allokerings modell som tar hänsyn till fastigheters speciella attribut, marknadsimperfektioner. Den vanligast förekommande metoden för att beräkna allokeringen mot fastigheter härstammar från modern portfolio teori (MPT). MPT baserar på ett antal antaganden, varav ett är en effektiv marknad. Problematiken ligger i att fastigheter inte kvalificerar sig inom ramen för den effektiva marknaden då de delvis räknas som en illikvid tillgång, förenade med höga transaktionskostnader. Marknadsimperfektioner resulterar i risk vilket logiskt leder till en lägre vikt av fastigheter i portföljen. För att utvärdera den optimala allokeringen mot fastigheter i en portfölj med flera tillgångar används en modifierad version av den klassiska medelvariationsmodellen som tar hänsyn till vissa av marknadsimperfektioner. Den modifierade versionen tar hänsyn till risk aversion, transaktionskostnad och försäljningstid. Modellen är uppdelad i två tillvägagångsätt, den ena benämnd som benchmark- och den andra som normativa metoden, baserat på varsin vetenskaplig artikel. Modellen testas på den svenska marknaden under nuvarande marknadsförutsättningar för att bedöma dess tillämplighet. Resultatet från benchmarkmetoden visar på en optimal fastighetsallokering om 0,72 – 5,84 %. Resultaten för den normativa modellen är förkastade som ofullständiga och opålitliga. I vilket fall identifieras riskaversionen som den mest avgörande faktorn i båda modellerna. Benchmarkmetoden ger en lägre optimal allokering gentemot fastigheter, än den som räknas fram med den klassiska mean-variance metoden. Den utvidgade modellen anses vara en användbar och giltig metod som tar hänsyn till de marknadsimperfektioner som fastigheter karaktäriseras av.

This thesis consists of three essays that explore the dynamics of interconnected markets and examine the relationships between markets, investor behavior, and fundamental characteristics of the firm and the economy. In the first essay, we investigate the role of trade credit links in generating cross-border return predictability between international firms. Using data from 43 countries from 1993 to 2009, we find that firms with high trade credit in producer countries have stock returns that are strongly predictable based on the returns of their associated customer countries. This behavior is especially prevalent among firms with high levels of foreign sales. To better understand this effect we develop an asset pricing model in which firms in different countries are connected by trade credit links. The model offers further predictions about this phenomenon, including stronger predictability during periods of high credit constraints and low uninformed trading volume. We find supportive empirical evidence for these predictions. The second essay investigates the dynamics of commodity futures volatility. I derive the variance decomposition for the futures basis to show how unexpected excess returns result from new information about expected future interest rates, convenience yields, and risk premia. Using data on major commodity futures markets and global bilateral commodity trade, I analyze the extent to which commodity volatility is related to fundamental uncertainty arising from increased emerging market demand and macroeconomic uncertainty, and control for the potential impact of financial frictions introduced by changing market structure and index trading. I find that a higher concentration in the emerging market importers of a commodity is associated with higher futures volatility. Commodity futures volatility is significantly predictable using variables capturing macroeconomic uncertainty. The third essay investigates the differential explanatory power of consumer (importing countries) and producer (exporting countries) risk in explaining the volatility of commodity spot premia and term premia using trade-weighted indices of GDP volatility. Using data for major commodity futures markets, bilateral commodity trade, exchange rates, and GDP for countries trading these commodities, I test hypotheses on the heterogeneous impact of consumer and producer shocks, potentially driven by differences in hedging preferences and investment planning horizons. Producer risk is significant for both short-dated and long-dated maturities, while consumer risk has greater explanatory power for the volatility of the term spread.

Cette thèse se compose de trois articles sur les politiques budgétaires et monétaires optimales. Dans le premier article, J'étudie la détermination conjointe de la politique budgétaire et monétaire optimale dans un cadre néo-keynésien avec les marchés du travail frictionnels, de la monnaie et avec distortion des taux d'imposition du revenu du travail. Dans le premier article, je trouve que lorsque le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs est faible, la politique Ramsey-optimale appelle à un taux optimal d'inflation annuel significativement plus élevé, au-delà de 9.5%, qui est aussi très volatile, au-delà de 7.4%. Le gouvernement Ramsey utilise l'inflation pour induire des fluctuations efficaces dans les marchés du travail, malgré le fait que l'évolution des prix est coûteuse et malgré la présence de la fiscalité du travail variant dans le temps. Les résultats quantitatifs montrent clairement que le planificateur s'appuie plus fortement sur l'inflation, pas sur l'impôts, pour lisser les distorsions dans l'économie au cours du cycle économique. En effet, il ya un compromis tout à fait clair entre le taux optimal de l'inflation et sa volatilité et le taux d'impôt sur le revenu optimal et sa variabilité. Le plus faible est le degré de rigidité des prix, le plus élevé sont le taux d'inflation optimal et la volatilité de l'inflation et le plus faible sont le taux d'impôt optimal sur le revenu et la volatilité de l'impôt sur le revenu. Pour dix fois plus petit degré de rigidité des prix, le taux d'inflation optimal et sa volatilité augmentent remarquablement, plus de 58% et 10%, respectivement, et le taux d'impôt optimal sur le revenu et sa volatilité déclinent de façon spectaculaire. Ces résultats sont d'une grande importance étant donné que dans les modèles frictionnels du marché du travail sans politique budgétaire et monnaie, ou dans les Nouveaux cadres keynésien même avec un riche éventail de rigidités réelles et nominales et un minuscule degré de rigidité des prix, la stabilité des prix semble être l'objectif central de la politique monétaire optimale. En l'absence de politique budgétaire et la demande de monnaie, le taux d'inflation optimal tombe très proche de zéro, avec une volatilité environ 97 pour cent moins, compatible avec la littérature. Dans le deuxième article, je montre comment les résultats quantitatifs impliquent que le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs et les coûts de l'aide sociale de règles monétaires sont liées négativement. Autrement dit, le plus faible est le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs, le plus grand sont les coûts sociaux des règles de politique monétaire. Toutefois, dans un contraste saisissant par rapport à la littérature, les règles qui régissent à la production et à l'étroitesse du marché du travail entraînent des coûts de bien-être considérablement plus faible que la règle de ciblage de l'inflation. C'est en particulier le cas pour la règle qui répond à l'étroitesse du marché du travail. Les coûts de l'aide sociale aussi baisse remarquablement en augmentant la taille du coefficient de production dans les règles monétaires. Mes résultats indiquent qu'en augmentant le pouvoir de négociation du travailleur au niveau Hosios ou plus, les coûts de l'aide sociale des trois règles monétaires diminuent significativement et la réponse à la production ou à la étroitesse du marché du travail n'entraîne plus une baisse des coûts de bien-être moindre que la règle de ciblage de l'inflation, qui est en ligne avec la littérature existante. Dans le troisième article, je montre d'abord que la règle Friedman dans un modèle monétaire avec une contrainte de type cash-in-advance pour les entreprises n’est pas optimale lorsque le gouvernement pour financer ses dépenses a accès à des taxes à distorsion sur la consommation. Je soutiens donc que, la règle Friedman en présence de ces taxes à distorsion est optimale si nous supposons un modèle avec travaie raw-efficace où seule le travaie raw est soumis à la contrainte de type cash-in-advance et la fonction d'utilité est homothétique dans deux types de main-d'oeuvre et séparable dans la consommation. Lorsque la fonction de production présente des rendements constants à l'échelle, contrairement au modèle des produits de trésorerie de crédit que les prix de ces deux produits sont les mêmes, la règle Friedman est optimal même lorsque les taux de salaire sont différents. Si la fonction de production des rendements d'échelle croissant ou decroissant, pour avoir l'optimalité de la règle Friedman, les taux de salaire doivent être égales. / This dissertation consists of three essays on optimal fiscal and monetary policies. In the first two essays, I consider New Keynesian frameworks with frictional labor markets, money and distortionary income tax rates. In the first one, I study the joint determination of optimal fiscal and monetary policy and the role of worker's bargaining power on this determination. In the second one, I study the effects of worker’s bargaining power on the welfare costs of three monetary policy rules, which are: inflation targeting and simple monetary rules that respond to output and labor market tightness, with and without interest-rate smoothing. In the third essay, I study the optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies where demand for money is motivated by firms, originated in a cash-in-advance constraint. In the first essay, I find that when the worker’s bargaining power is low, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for a significantly high optimal annual rate of inflation, in excess of 9.5%, that is also highly volatile, in excess of 7.4%. The Ramsey government uses inflation to induce efficient fluctuations in labor markets, despite the fact that changing prices is costly and despite the presence of time-varying labor taxes. The quantitative results clearly show that the planner relies more heavily on inflation, not taxes, in smoothing distortions in the economy over the business cycle. Indeed, there is a quite clear trade-off between the optimal inflation rate and its volatility and the optimal income tax rate and its variability. The smaller is the degree of price stickiness, the higher are the optimal inflation rate and inflation volatility and the lower are the optimal income tax rate and income tax volatility. For a ten times smaller degree of price stickiness, the optimal rate of inflation and its volatility rise remarkably, over 58% and 10%, respectively, and the optimal income tax rate and its volatility decline dramatically. These results are significant given that in the frictional labor market models without fiscal policy and money, or in the Walrasian-based New Keynesian frameworks with even a rich array of real and nominal rigidities and for even a miniscule degree of price stickiness, price stability appears to be the central goal of optimal monetary policy. Absent fiscal policy and money demand frictions, optimal rate of inflation falls to very near zero, with a volatility about 97 percent lesser, consistent with the literature. In the second essay, I show how the quantitative results imply that worker's bargaining weight and welfare costs of monetary rules are related negatively. That is, the lower the bargaining power of workers, the larger the welfare losses of monetary rules. However, in a sharp contrast to the literature, the rules that respond to output and labor market tightness feature considerably lower welfare costs than the inflation targeting rule. This is specifically the case for the rule that responds to labor market tightness. The welfare costs also remarkably decline by increasing the size of the output coefficient in the monetary rules. My findings indicate that by raising the worker's bargaining power to the Hosios level and higher, welfare losses of the three monetary rules drop significantly and response to output or market tightness does not, anymore, imply lower welfare costs than the inflation targeting rule, which is in line with the existing literature. In the third essay, I first show that the Friedman rule in a monetary model with a cash-in-advance constraint for firms is not optimal when the government to finance its expenditures has access to distortionary taxes on consumption. I then argue that, the Friedman rule in the presence of these distorting taxes is optimal if we assume a model with raw-efficient labors where only the raw labor is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint and the utility function is homothetic in two types of labor and separable in consumption. Once the production function exhibits constant-returns-to-scale, unlike the cash-credit goods model that the prices of both goods are the same, the Friedman is optimal even when wage rates are different. If the production function has decreasing or increasing-returns-to-scale, then to have the optimality of the Friedman rule, wage rates should be equal.

Cette thèse étudie différents mécanismes par lesquels l'immobilier des entreprises influe sur l'investissement, l'emploi et la mobilité des Sociétés Non-Financières (SNFs). L'actif immobilier représente une part très importante de la valeur de l'actif des entreprises et les locaux constituent souvent un des principaux postes de dépenses des SNFs. Les prix de l'immobilier ont un effet sur la valeur de l'actif que les entreprises peuvent déposer en garantie et sur le coût des facteurs de production. Dans le cadre d'un marché du crédit frictionnel, la capacité d'emprunt des entreprises peut être accrue par une hausse de la valeur de marché des actifs. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse étudient cet effet de collatéral et ses conséquences sur l'investissement et l'emploi. Le premier chapitre présente une modélisation dynamique qui met l'accent sur le comportement des variables relatives au marché du travail. Le second chapitre explore les effets hétérogènes entre entreprises en analysant des données microéconomiques. Le dernier chapitre porte sur les conséquences des spécificités des coûts d'ajustement de l'immobilier. En étudiant le comportement de mobilité d'entreprises qui sont soumises à des coûts de déménagement différenciés, nous mettons en évidence un effet notable des coûts associés au changement de la taille des locaux sur la dynamique de l'emploi. / This thesis studies channels through which corporate real-estate affects investment, employment and mobility of Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs). Real-estate assets account for a sizable share of firms' asset value and premises are often one of the main expenditure items of NFCs. Real-estate prices hence have a bearing on the value of firms' pledgeable assets and on the cost of inputs. In a frictional credit market, the firms' borrowing capacity can be enhanced by an increase in asset's value. The first two chapters of this thesis study this collateral channel and its effects on investment and employment. The first chapter proposes a dynamic setting with a focus on labor market variables whereas the second explores heterogeneous effects across firms, based on micro-data. The last chapter examines the consequences of the peculiarities of real-estate adjustment costs. Studying the relocation behaviour of firms facing varying moving costs, we document important effects of the costs associated with a change in the size of the premises on the employment dynamics.