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Rethinking Legal Retribution

In this paper I discuss retributivist justifications for legal punishment. I argue that the main moral retributivist theories advanced so far fail to support a plausible system of legal punishment. As an alternative, I suggest, with some reservations, the legal retributivism advanced by Alan Brudner in his Punishment and Freedom.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1097
Date28 April 2011
CreatorsParsley, Stephen
PublisherDigital Archive @ GSU
Source SetsGeorgia State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePhilosophy Theses

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