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Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of both the legal system and of society more broadly yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in terms of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment. Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature, inspired by the work of Susan Meld Shell. Following Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself. Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of both the legal system and of society more broadly yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in terms of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment. Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature, inspired by the work of Susan Meld Shell. Following Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself. Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.

In this paper I discuss retributivist justifications for legal punishment. I argue that the main moral retributivist theories advanced so far fail to support a plausible system of legal punishment. As an alternative, I suggest, with some reservations, the legal retributivism advanced by Alan Brudner in his Punishment and Freedom.

This thesis explores the strength of the two major theories of punishment, consequentialism and retributivism. It also explores the two most critiqued systems of punishment in the world: The U.S and Norway. By presenting the idea that retributivism is the only plausible theory that can morally justify the U.S. penal practises, I argue against the theory by incorporating various objections delivered by Antony Duff, Michael Zimmerman, and Jeffrie Murphy. I then explore the question of what could possibly ground the Norwegian justice system, for the answer to this is crucial, if we hope to demand prison reform and tailor our systems to resemble the Norwegian ideal. To answer this question, I present a theory that incorporates the ‘capabilities approach’ as developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, arguing that the Norwegian prison system is grounded in a hybrid theory of consequentialism that aims to enhance our human rights.

Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ (and cognate expressions) as ‘worthiness to be happy’ (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein). As a rule, Kant’s commentators do not find this remarkable. Correctly understood, however, Kant’s gloss on ‘morality’ is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. In it, I argue that whenever we encounter Kant’s gloss, we are faced with an implicit, durable cluster of unjustified commitments; that these commitments both antedate and survive his ‘critical period’; that they are fundamentally practical in nature (i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices); and that these commitments entail a number of problematic theological consequences. I argue, in particular, that Kant’s gloss is a habit that signals, obscurely and implicitly, his antecedent commitments to the practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, and to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness and unhappiness of immoral agents, on the other. I show that this habit has key implications for Kant’s thinking about the agent that he calls ‘God.’ My point of departure is Kant’s claim, in his Religion, that the human being’s particular deeds are imputable to her ‘all the way down,’ only on condition that the underlying ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung) from which they arise (according to their kind, qua moral or immoral) is imputable to her as well—that is, only if her (im)moral character may be regarded as the upshot of, or in some sense identical to, an utterly unassisted, unmotivated, originary deed on her part. I argue that Kant evades the question whether we really are permitted, without further ado, to regard this disposition (and with it an agent’s deeds) as so imputable. He simply affirms his commitment to the practice of imputing particular deeds to particular agents and, with this affirmation, affirms that he takes the warrant that it requires (the imputability of ‘Gesinnung’) to be secure. I argue, then, that the theoretical significance of imputation, as expressed in this extraordinary, evasive leap, supervenes on the urgency of the commitments that are expressed in Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ The practice for which we would lack a warrant if the human being’s character were not imputable to her is the imputation of her deeds under a description (of imputation) that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punishment—specifically and only, however, to the extent that Kant takes punishments to be justifiable in none but strictly retributivist terms. These stakes and the constraining role of Kant’s habitual gloss are clearest, I argue, in his thinking about the practice of putting murderers to death—a practice, I argue, that has both a political and an eschatological significance for him.

This thesis provides a critique of the penology of capital punishment from the perspectives of Christianity and Islam. In order to ascertain the basic theological approaches of both religions towards capital punishment, Chapters 2 and 3 examine the core Scriptural texts, laws and traditions of both Christianity and Islam respectively. These chapters reveal how different methods of Scriptural interpretation and differences in religious practice, within each faith, have led to divergent opinions regarding the legitimacy and acceptability of capital punishment. Chapters 4 and 5 examine two of the primary penological justifications for the death penalty; retributivism and deterrence. It is demonstrated how they can be used, within secular and religious frameworks, to both condemn and condone the use of the punishment. Chapter 6 considers a variety of contemporary methods used to execute offenders and asks whether the methods used have any effect on the religious acceptance or rejection of the penalty. Finally, Chapter 7 presents one of the most controversial aspects of the contemporary death penalty debate, namely the unequal application of the penalty as it pertains particularly to black offenders, indigent offenders and mentally ill offenders. This serious criticism of the death penalty is considered first in general secular terms and then in light of the teachings of both religions and it is asked how the religious arguments in favour of the death penalty stand in light of such serious violations of human rights and justice. The thesis concludes with the assertion that, while a strong case can be made from within both religions for the use of capital punishment in principle, in practice given current practices of criminal justice systems worldwide there is a strong case to be made, if not for abolition, then at least for a drastic curtailment of the practice and a long-term moratorium on capital punishment on religious grounds.

What ought to be criminalized? There are many different answers to this question and the justifications vary widely. There are some things that most people seem to be able to agree onbut the opposite is very much true of other behaviors, examples that spring to mind are drugs, prostitution and gambling. The subject matter of this analysis falls square in the latter category. Bad samaritan laws prohibit individuals from refraining to rescue others in peril aslong as the risk to their own safety is minimal. Many countries in the world have passed such laws and yet they remain fiercely contested. At a glance this might seem odd: isn’t it a moral imperative to come to the aid of others who need our help, especially when there is little at stake for ourselves? Few actually contest this principle but there is a big leap from immorality to criminalization. Certain bad behaviors should be of no concern to the state but there are difficulties in deciding what kinds of immoral behavior should be subject to criminalization. This analysis is an attempt to determine whether bad samaritanism is the kind of wrong that merits state punishment. An ideational critique where a variety of arguments from the literature are surveyed, these arguments are then tested against the normative criteria of two theories of punishment: consequentialism and retributivism. Although there is some merit to bad samaritan laws, the author concludes that both traditions should reject them.

Although the literature in the field of criminal justice and philosophy is full of ideas of what constitutes "justice," little to nothing has been done to see where the average individual's opinion falls in relation to these ideas. This paper analyzes a cross-sectional convenience sample of students at UCF to determine their preference of six models of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, fairness, retributivism, moralism, and libertarianism. Correlating demographic factors are also discussed.

The idea that free will may be an illusion has been a source of great concern. It has led to suggestions that it may be wise to avoid public discussion of this topic lest it lead to a general moral decay. This concern has seemingly been supported by research demonstrating that individuals, when primed with the notion they lack free will, tend to cheat more and prefer less retributive punishment. The current research suggests that these effects can be moderated by the introduction of a second prime. In experiment one, participants believed they were being tested on note-taking and the subsequent recall of the content of two articles when, in fact, the dependent measure was actually the degree to which, after being primed with the articles, they cheated on a math task. It was hypothesized that the cheating effect noted in prior research would be moderated by the introduction of a second prime – one that extends the concept of self beyond our dualistic intuitions. In a second experiment, it was hypothesized that this prime would also moderate the reported reduction of preference toward retributivist punishment. In each experiment, the results trended in the direction hypothesized but in neither case were they statistically significant. The difficulties surrounding methodology and reproducibility in this type of research is discussed and suggestions for improvements in experiment design are offered.