Some resource-dependent countries experience substantial increases in
government revenue during natural resource booms. Recent theoretical and
empirical contributions (Robinson et al. 2006, Brollo et al. 2013) have argued
that such abundance of windfalls can have a negative effect on the
functioning of local institutions. In particular, abundance of windfalls could
increase the incidence of corruption because their presence aggravates the
moral hazard problem that exists between citizens and their elected authorities.
This is so because an increased budget means that officials can appropiate
rents illegally without compromising their obligations with the electorate,
thus distorting the inferences that citizens make about their authorities’
competence. Furthermore, such agency problem could be aggravated by the
self-selection of relatively worse candidates entering politics (assuming rents
are more valuable for the relatively less skilled), because incumbent mayors
(including corrupt ones) would face weaker competition. Exploiting substantial
time and spatial variation in the amount of mining-related transfers
received by the districts of Peru during the 2000s commodity boom, I implement
a difference-in-differences strategy to put the mentioned theory to test.
I find evidence supporting the hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect of windfalls
on the incidence of corruption, and a negative effect of windfalls on the
quality of candidates drawn to challenge incumbents and compete for public
office. I do not find strong evidence of the theorized relationship between
the two phenomena, but I propose further research pathways to improve our
understanding of the results.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PUCP/oai:tesis.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.12404/14818 |
Date | 26 August 2019 |
Creators | Guerrero Amezaga, Maria Elena |
Contributors | Orihuela Paredes, José Carlos |
Publisher | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, PE |
Source Sets | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú |
Language | Spanish |
Detected Language | English |
Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | Atribución-NoComercial 2.5 Perú, info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/pe/ |
Page generated in 0.0022 seconds