Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of
resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What
underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example,
these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically,
how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be
effective without itself instituting further violence?
The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the
work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being,
or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the
first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is
to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a
persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an
enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just
violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of
the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the
instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by
one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good
enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just
warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the
cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's
enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset
regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en
. hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld,
soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige
oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset
teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel?
Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van
die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise
than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike
bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in
verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd
alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n
vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten
gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen
aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld
maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van
verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van
geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens
se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed
genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die
verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer
deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis
trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/52920 |
| Date | 04 1900 |
| Creators | Douglas, Helen L. (Helen Lillian) |
| Contributors | Van der Merwe, W. L., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 88 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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