The dissertation proposes an institutional explanation of the lobbying strategies private actors employ to influence European Union decision-making. Its main argument is that lobbying strategies are allowed and constrained by a configuration of institutions. In order to understand what makes political actors adopt certain lobbying strategies, it is essential to examine a multi-layered institutional set up: European, sectoral and issue-specific. At these levels of analysis, identifiable institutions affect the way in which collective action is organised, the lobbying tactics employed, and the political institutions lobbyists target. The dissertation is based on a survey of pharmaceutical firms in five Member States, and on a detailed examination of four lobbying campaigns conducted by the pharmaceutical industry in Europe between 1988-1998. The survey's findings and an analysis of the campaigns reveal that the legal environment, the balance of power between European Union institutions, the sector characteristics, and the nature of the policy community, are the institutions that affect lobbying strategies in the pharmaceutical sector. These institutions affect lobbying by setting the boundaries within which political action is allowed, by determining the saliency of different types of resources, by providing lobbyists with information about the lobbying options open to their rivals, and by imposing a learning process on lobbyists.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:284825 |
| Date | January 1998 |
| Creators | Shechter, Yoav |
| Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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