This thesis analyses the political economy of the decision of Italy and Germany to participate in the euro. The emphasis is on understanding the economic rationales employed in each country in support of euro membership.
For Italy, the central argument is that Italy outsourced monetary policy management to the ECB in order to delimit deficient domestic policy making and import German monetary credibility. This transferred the costs of monetary orthodoxy to Europe, and the thesis briefly examines places where we might observe those costs.
For Germany, the argument is that, out of respect for the national humiliation and shame of the Second World War, Germany shirked the possibility of unilaterally leading European monetary policy in favour of a European solution that suited German economic interests. German actors were aware of these economic benefits at the time.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2848 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Creators | Schalke, Thomas |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2018 Thomas H.R. Schalke, default |
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