In the first essay we examine the effect of concurrent lending and underwriting on IPO withdrawal, we find that IPOs underwritten by the firms’ concurrent lending banks are significantly more likely to be withdrawn. The result is robust to controlling for the common factors that affect IPO withdrawal and also for endogeneity using a propensity score matching portfolio. Our evidence suggests a cost to IPO firms’ hiring concurrent lending banks as underwriters despite the potential benefit of informational scope economies such intermediaries may provide. It is consistent with an alternative argument that a current lending and underwriting bank has less incentive to help sell its client firms’ securities because of its lock-in of the firms’ subsequent borrowing needs even when it fails to sell the securities.
In the second essay, we examine the investment decisions of second-time IPO firms after successfully going public. Our findings show that, contrary to first time IPOs, second-time IPOs are not active acquirers and spend significantly more on CAPEX and R&D than first-time IPOs. Unlike acquisitions in the post-IPO period, CAPEX and R&D spending benefit second-time IPOs’ long run performance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:USF/oai:scholarcommons.usf.edu:etd-6862 |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Creators | Chen, Gaole |
| Publisher | Scholar Commons |
| Source Sets | University of South Flordia |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Graduate Theses and Dissertations |
| Rights | default |
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