This study applies Destler's institutional counterweights to Putnam's two-level analysis, substituting Liberal Institutionalism and Realism for internationalism and isolationism, in a comparative case study of the roles played by the U.S. and the EC in multilateral trade negotiations in agriculture under the aegis of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade during the first half of the Uruguay Round. Using game theory as an analytical tool in the process, this present study demonstrates that a clear pattern emerges in which stages of cooperation and deadlock can be easily anticipated in games of Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma in accordance with various but predictable levels of institutional influence.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc935682 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Gordon, H. William (Harold William) |
| Contributors | Reban, Milan Jan, Kemerer, Frank R., Forde, Steven |
| Publisher | University of North Texas |
| Source Sets | University of North Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | iv, 100 leaves, Text |
| Coverage | United States, Europe |
| Rights | Public, Gordon, H. William (Harold William), Copyright, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights |
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