Return to search

Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America

Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest. / Government

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:harvard.edu/oai:dash.harvard.edu:1/12274631
Date04 June 2016
CreatorsHolland, Alisha Caroline
ContributorsDominguez, Jorge I.
PublisherHarvard University
Source SetsHarvard University
Languageen_US
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
Rightsopen

Page generated in 0.002 seconds