No description available.

Forbearance is defined for the purpose of the present dissertation as, “the attempt to suppress the visible signs of negative emotion (i.e., emotional expression) and visible behaviors (i.e., the expression of negative vengeful or avoidant motives) in response to a hurt or offense, often (but not always) for the sake of group harmony.” I reviewed the literature on forbearance and cross-cultural studies in suppression of emotion or emotional expression under the framework of New Big Five personality processes and cultural models of self and relating. Then I offered three propositions about forbearance. Furthermore, I collected three samples and described four studies to develop and test the construct validity of Forbearance Scale as well as the Group-Harmony Forbearance Index. Last but not least, I discussed implications for future research and practice related to forbearance.

Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

Multi-market contact can either escalate or deescalate rivalry. Recent empirical work has revealed an inverted U-shaped relationship between multi-market contact and rivalry. These findings have lead many to suggest that mutual forbearance (MF), a switch from competition to cooperation across markets, is a natural outcome of increasing multi-market contact between two firms. Despite the relatively widespread acceptance of this suggestion, we do not have a theoretically grounded explanation for how this switch from rivalry to mutual forbearance occurs. This dissertation takes up this task. Theories of learning and trust are used as the grounding for the development of a theoretical model of the process by which multi-market rivals switch from competition to cooperation across markets. The model is tested using data from the U.S. Scheduled Passenger Airline Industry. Results support the general theoretical foundations of the model and provide new insights into the genesis of mutual forbearance.

Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest. / Government

No description available.

No description available.

No / During the subprime crisis, the FDIC has shown, once again, laxity in resolving and closing insolvent institutions. Ronn and Verma (1986) call the tolerance level below which a bank closure is triggered the regulatory policy parameter. We derive a model in which we make this parameter stochastic and bank-specific to infer the stock market view of the regulatory capital forbearance value. For 565 U.S. listed banks during 1990 to 2012, the countercyclical forbearance fraction in capital, most substantial in recessions, could represent 17%, on average, of the market valuation of bank equity and could go as high as 100%.

本篇論文主要探討不同風險因子對於壽險業安定基金保費之影響。首先建立一個評價安定基金保費之機制，此模型考慮壽險公司投資決策、負債組合、監理寬容以及市場不確定性。接著使用蒙地卡羅模擬不同風險因子變動之下的公平保費。其數值分析顯示壽險公司之權益組合占資產比例、槓桿、監理寬容期間以及監理標準皆對公平保費有正向之影響。 / In this study, a valuation model is derived to price the fair premium in the insurance guarantee fund incorporating investment selection, liability portfolio, regulatory forbearance and market uncertainty. Then, Monte Carlo method is employed to measure the fair premium based on various important pricing factors. Finally, the numerical experiments and sensitivity analysis are conducted to investigate their impacts on the premiums. The results of our study indicate that the equity shares in the asset portfolio, the leverage ratio of the firm, the grace period and the tolerance of the capital threshold have the positive impacts on the risk-based premiums in the proposed ex-ante insurance guarantee fund scheme.