This thesis is concerned with the relation between bank regulation and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Two major instruments of regulatory intervention are considered: bank levy and bank bailouts. The major objective of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following questions: Do bank levies increase the risk-taking of banks in a competitive environment? When do bank bailouts decrease banks` risk-taking? Does the international coordination of bank bailouts affect the relation between bailouts and the risk-taking behaviour of banks? Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks? How could an efficient bailout policy be designed and implemented? The bank levy and cooperation between national regulators play an important role in the recently adopted Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This directive is a cornerstone of bank regulation in Europe. Although the conversion of debt into equity (bail-in) in emergencies is the key component of the current regulation, bailouts, or at least the assistance to struggling banks, should not be excluded. As the ordinary resolution tools, for instance, bail-in, have not yet been tested in a real crisis, and due to the fact that it will take time to prepare global institutions for such a tool, it may be useful to have an adequately designed tool of last resort available, such as an adequate bailout policy, in order to avoid the disruption of critical economic functions. We show that a bank levy may decrease banks`risk-taking behaviour. Bank bailouts can also decrease the risk-taking of banks. This depends on the regulator`s ability to condition his bailout policy in accordance with the macroeconomic environment, which has an impact on the banks` probability of success, or on his ability to condition the bailout policy on the banks` systemic relevance. Coordination of bailouts through a multinational regulator can improve welfare. The desirability of internationally coordinated bailouts depends on the dimension of the crisis. If the crisis is severe, it may be more efficient to delegate bank bailouts to a multinational regulator. However, such a delegation is not always feasible. Therefore, a predefined burden sharing of bank bailouts is necessary in order to achieve an efficient resolution of banks in distress.

Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

This thesis is concerned with the relation between bank regulation and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Two major instruments of regulatory intervention are considered: bank levy and bank bailouts. The major objective of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following questions: Do bank levies increase the risk-taking of banks in a competitive environment? When do bank bailouts decrease banks` risk-taking? Does the international coordination of bank bailouts affect the relation between bailouts and the risk-taking behaviour of banks? Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks? How could an efficient bailout policy be designed and implemented? The bank levy and cooperation between national regulators play an important role in the recently adopted Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This directive is a cornerstone of bank regulation in Europe. Although the conversion of debt into equity (bail-in) in emergencies is the key component of the current regulation, bailouts, or at least the assistance to struggling banks, should not be excluded. As the ordinary resolution tools, for instance, bail-in, have not yet been tested in a real crisis, and due to the fact that it will take time to prepare global institutions for such a tool, it may be useful to have an adequately designed tool of last resort available, such as an adequate bailout policy, in order to avoid the disruption of critical economic functions. We show that a bank levy may decrease banks`risk-taking behaviour. Bank bailouts can also decrease the risk-taking of banks. This depends on the regulator`s ability to condition his bailout policy in accordance with the macroeconomic environment, which has an impact on the banks` probability of success, or on his ability to condition the bailout policy on the banks` systemic relevance. Coordination of bailouts through a multinational regulator can improve welfare. The desirability of internationally coordinated bailouts depends on the dimension of the crisis. If the crisis is severe, it may be more efficient to delegate bank bailouts to a multinational regulator. However, such a delegation is not always feasible. Therefore, a predefined burden sharing of bank bailouts is necessary in order to achieve an efficient resolution of banks in distress.

Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening. Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks. This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen auf die Realwirtschaft in drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Kapitel 1 klassifiziert die geografische Diversifikation einer Großzahl von Banken, anhand deren international syndizierten Kreditportfolios. Ergebnisse zeigen ein höheres Kreditangebot durch diversifizierte Banken während Bankenkrisen die sich in Kreditnehmerländern ereignen. Dieses relativ stabilere Kreditangebot führt zu höherem Investitions- und Beschäftigungswachstum von Unternehmen. Eine weiterführende Unterteilung von Banken anhand derer Nationalität zeigt eine Rangfolge auf: diversifizierte inländische Banken erweisen sich als die stabilste und ausländische Banken mit geringer Diversifikation als die instabilste Finanzierungsquelle. In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich die Rolle der industriellen Spezialisierung von Banken in der Transmission von Finanzierungsshocks. Anhand der Ergebnisse schützen Banken Unternehmen die Teil ihrer spezialisierten Industrien sind vor der Bankenkrise und reduzieren ihre Kreditvergabe hingegen am stärksten an Industrien, in welchen sie weniger spezialisiert sind. Darüber hinaus finde ich Evidenz für Übertragungseffekte durch reduzierte Kreditvergabe auch in Nicht-Krisenländern. Dieser Übertragungseffekt ist jedoch gedämpft für Unternehmen aus spezialisierten Industrien. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Effekte von Bankenrettungen in Europa auf die globalen Kreditströme. Gerettete Banken weisen einen höheren Anstieg des Anteils an inländischen Unternehmen in der Kreditvergabe auf als nicht-gerettete Banken. Das negative Kreditangebot für ausländische Unternehmen führt zu einer Verringerung des Absatz- und Beschäftigungswachstums. Im inländischen Markt hingegen führt die Bankenrettung zu einer Verzerrung der Kreditallokation, hin zu größeren und weniger innovativen Unternehmen. Darüber hinaus dokumentiere ich eine stärkere politische Einflussnahme, da Kontrollrechte im Zuge der Bankenrettung an die Regierung übertragen werden. / This thesis investigates the effect of banking crises on real economic outcomes in three independent chapters. In chapter one, I classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. Results show that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. The positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment growth for firms. Further distinguishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most fickle. In chapter two, I show that banks' industry specialization determines how banks transmit funding shocks during banking crises to borrowers and how they spill over to non-crisis countries. Results show that banks insulate their main industries from the banking crisis while they reduce lending most to their non-main industries. Moreover, I provide evidence on spillover effects, as banks hit by a banking crisis in one borrower country reduce lending to firms in non-crisis countries. However, this contagion effect is significantly weaker for firms in banks' main industries. In chapter three, I examine the effect of government support for European banks, such as recapitalizations on financial integration and firm outcomes. Results show that bailout banks increase their home bias in lending by a quarter more than non-bailout banks. In turn, the negative loan supply effect on discriminated foreign firms translates into lower sales and employment growth. In the home market, government support distorts credit allocation by shifting lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms. Moreover, I document that politicians gain influence over banks by transferring control rights to the government as part of the support scheme.