Multi-market contact can either escalate or deescalate rivalry. Recent empirical work has revealed an inverted U-shaped relationship between multi-market contact and rivalry. These findings have lead many to suggest that mutual forbearance (MF), a switch from competition to cooperation across markets, is a natural outcome of increasing multi-market contact between two firms. Despite the relatively widespread acceptance of this suggestion, we do not have a theoretically grounded explanation for how this switch from rivalry to mutual forbearance occurs. This dissertation takes up this task. Theories of learning and trust are used as the grounding for the development of a theoretical model of the process by which multi-market rivals switch from competition to cooperation across markets. The model is tested using data from the U.S. Scheduled Passenger Airline Industry. Results support the general theoretical foundations of the model and provide new insights into the genesis of mutual forbearance.

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本論文探討台北市連鎖式便利商店的市場進入決策。研究發現在便利商店的產業裡，相較於多重市場接觸(亦即是否已同時出現在其他市場)的考量，與競爭對手門市的距離對廠商的進入決策有較大的影響。此外，上期競爭對手存在與否，也是廠商是否進入該市場的重要衡量依據。大型連鎖店會進入前一期競爭較激烈的市場，這些市場競爭對手的門市已有一家以上；而小型連鎖店通常不會依據對手的門市數目來決定其進入的決策。最後，利用不同的落後期變數設定，本文發現廠商的進入決策具有一致性。這表示在台北市，便利商店已經是相當成熟的產業了。 / In this paper we study entry decisions of the convenience store chains in Taipei. We find that the distance between store pairs is more relevant to firms' entry decisions than the multimarket contact (i.e., firms encounter each other in multiple markets) in this industry. In addition, the presence of a firm's rivals in the previous period plays an important role in the entry decision. The large convenience store chains are more likely to enter more competitive markets, such as markets consisting of more than one rivals' store. On the other hand, the small chains are indifferent to their rivals' presence when making their entry decisions. Lastly, firms' entry decisions are consistent when different measurements of lagged variables are used. We interpret that the convenience store industry may have reached a stable state in Taipei.

本文以美國境內航空市場為例，探討多重市場接觸與價格離散的關聯，並研究大型航空公司併購案前後多重市場接觸對航空公司競爭策略的影響。本研究發現：(一) 相互容忍說於併購案發生前後皆成立。(二) 相較於考量擴大市場的市佔率，航空公司更應該關注與競爭者間的競爭關係。(三) 併購案發生前後，航空公司的訂價行為都深受競爭對手的競爭策略影響。(四) 併購案發生前，因競爭者多，市場上航空公司平均市佔率的大小是航空公司可採取競爭手段重要因素之一。在最大的1000 個市場中，雖然每家航空公司的市場力量不大，航空公司仍可採取價格競爭，然若是對手間聯合懲罰，則航空公司不敢採取激進手段，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越大。而在次要競爭的市場中，則因航空公司的平均市占率是最大的1000 個市場的兩倍，因此航空公司並未有明顯競爭行為。但若考量競爭對手間的碰面次數，則多重市場接觸與不同分位價格關係為正，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越低。併購案發生後，因航空公司間彼此箝制力量大，與競爭對手間的碰面次數越多，越傾向隱性勾結，且高價位的價格上升較低價位價格多，使價格離散程度越大。 / In this paper, we discuss whether multimarket contact matters for price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry, and compare the influence of multimarket contact on airlines’ competition strategies before and after airline mergers and acquisitions. We find that: (a) Before and after the mergers, mutual forbearance exists. (b) In contrast to an airline‘s market share, the relationship between airlines and itself plays a more important role in its pricing strategy.(c) Before and after the mergers, airline companies’pricing strategies are significantly affected by their competitors’strategies. (d) Before the mergers, because of the intense competition, it is the size of the competitors‘ market share that the company decide whether to take aggressive strategies. In the top 1000 competitive markets,airline companies will take aggressive actions to get more passengers for the punishment from its competitor is an incredible threat, however, if competitors collude together, airline companies will hardly dare to cut price. And the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is positive and significant. In the second competitive markets, since the average market share is twice bigger than in the top 1000 markets, airlines prefer not to participate in cut-throat competition. However, if competitors collude, then airline companies will cooperate together, and the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is negative and significant. After the mergers, increase in contacts with competitors would facilitate mutual forbearance and increase price dispersion and higher-percentile prices will increase more than lower-percentile prices.