This dissertation investigates the economic consequences from hedge accounting signals and risk management disclosure. I first examine the product market consequences to these accounting signals and related disclosure in Chapter 1, then stock market reactions to disclosure requirements in Chapter 2. Chapter 1 examines potential entrants’ strategic entry decisions in response to incumbents’ accounting information and related disclosure. I predict that potential entrants are more likely to enter markets in which the incumbents’ accounting information suggests higher future production costs that are specific to the incumbents themselves. I further hypothesize that the relation is stronger when the accounting signals are accompanied by more disclosure. Using detailed U.S. airline industry data and hedge accounting disclosure under SFAS 133, I find that potential entrants are more likely to enter routes in which the incumbents’ lower accumulated other comprehensive income from fuel hedges suggests their higher future production costs. This entry pattern is stronger when incumbents have more transparent annual report disclosure regarding their fuel hedge programs. The entry pattern is also stronger after a systematic increase in risk management disclosure requirements following the (exogenous) adoption of SFAS 161. Chapter 2 analyzes stock returns of U.S. airlines around events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. SFAS 161 enhanced the disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities. I find that U.S. airlines experienced statistically significant positive returns around the key events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. I then examine the cross-sectional variation of the returns around these events. Regression results provide initial support for the real effects theory that greater disclosure requirements could distort firms’ hedging and production decisions and lead to suboptimal behavior. In summary, this dissertation provides evidence that competitors use hedge accounting signals and related disclosure in making product market decisions. Meanwhile, additional risk-management disclosures may also distort firms’ hedging and production behavior, leading to suboptimal decisions. This dissertation sheds light on the ongoing projects by the FASB and the IASB on hedge accounting and disclosure and informs the regulators that costs and benefits should be weighted in hedge accounting policy setting.

This dissertation investigates the economic consequences from hedge accounting signals and risk management disclosure. I first examine the product market consequences to these accounting signals and related disclosure in Chapter 1, then stock market reactions to disclosure requirements in Chapter 2. Chapter 1 examines potential entrants’ strategic entry decisions in response to incumbents’ accounting information and related disclosure. I predict that potential entrants are more likely to enter markets in which the incumbents’ accounting information suggests higher future production costs that are specific to the incumbents themselves. I further hypothesize that the relation is stronger when the accounting signals are accompanied by more disclosure. Using detailed U.S. airline industry data and hedge accounting disclosure under SFAS 133, I find that potential entrants are more likely to enter routes in which the incumbents’ lower accumulated other comprehensive income from fuel hedges suggests their higher future production costs. This entry pattern is stronger when incumbents have more transparent annual report disclosure regarding their fuel hedge programs. The entry pattern is also stronger after a systematic increase in risk management disclosure requirements following the (exogenous) adoption of SFAS 161. Chapter 2 analyzes stock returns of U.S. airlines around events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. SFAS 161 enhanced the disclosure requirements for derivatives and hedging activities. I find that U.S. airlines experienced statistically significant positive returns around the key events leading up to the adoption of SFAS 161. I then examine the cross-sectional variation of the returns around these events. Regression results provide initial support for the real effects theory that greater disclosure requirements could distort firms’ hedging and production decisions and lead to suboptimal behavior. In summary, this dissertation provides evidence that competitors use hedge accounting signals and related disclosure in making product market decisions. Meanwhile, additional risk-management disclosures may also distort firms’ hedging and production behavior, leading to suboptimal decisions. This dissertation sheds light on the ongoing projects by the FASB and the IASB on hedge accounting and disclosure and informs the regulators that costs and benefits should be weighted in hedge accounting policy setting.

To counter the problem of the volatility of jet fuel prices within the United States, many financial managers of U.S. airlines use hedging as a financial tool to mitigate the risk of exposure to market price volatility. However, their efforts often lead to financial distress for their airlines. The purpose of this qualitative grounded theory study was to explore U.S. airline managers' use of financial hedging to reduce the risk of exposure from the volatility of jet fuel prices. The conceptual framework was Simkowitz's theory of modern finance, which concerns debt policy, dividend policy, and investment policy as they relate to financial decision making by upper management. The research questions addressed when, why, and how U.S. airline financial managers would consider the use of hedging as a financial tool to mitigate the risk in the purchase of jet fuel at times of lower jet fuel prices. Interviews with a purposive sample of 20 U.S. airline financial managers provided data for analysis and theory development of jet fuel hedging utilization in the U.S. airline industry. Data analysis using the constant comparative method enabled the development of a theory of jet fuel hedging utilization. Participants reported using over-the-counter derivatives purchasing strategies as a form of hedging to protect their airlines against spikes in jet fuel prices on the open market. Using study findings, managers may be able to reduce jet fuel operating costs in the U.S. airline industry. Implications for positive social change include potentially higher profits and more jobs as well as lower consumer prices.

本文以美國境內航空市場為例，探討多重市場接觸與價格離散的關聯，並研究大型航空公司併購案前後多重市場接觸對航空公司競爭策略的影響。本研究發現：(一) 相互容忍說於併購案發生前後皆成立。(二) 相較於考量擴大市場的市佔率，航空公司更應該關注與競爭者間的競爭關係。(三) 併購案發生前後，航空公司的訂價行為都深受競爭對手的競爭策略影響。(四) 併購案發生前，因競爭者多，市場上航空公司平均市佔率的大小是航空公司可採取競爭手段重要因素之一。在最大的1000 個市場中，雖然每家航空公司的市場力量不大，航空公司仍可採取價格競爭，然若是對手間聯合懲罰，則航空公司不敢採取激進手段，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越大。而在次要競爭的市場中，則因航空公司的平均市占率是最大的1000 個市場的兩倍，因此航空公司並未有明顯競爭行為。但若考量競爭對手間的碰面次數，則多重市場接觸與不同分位價格關係為正，且多重市場接觸越多，價格離散程度越低。併購案發生後，因航空公司間彼此箝制力量大，與競爭對手間的碰面次數越多，越傾向隱性勾結，且高價位的價格上升較低價位價格多，使價格離散程度越大。 / In this paper, we discuss whether multimarket contact matters for price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry, and compare the influence of multimarket contact on airlines’ competition strategies before and after airline mergers and acquisitions. We find that: (a) Before and after the mergers, mutual forbearance exists. (b) In contrast to an airline‘s market share, the relationship between airlines and itself plays a more important role in its pricing strategy.(c) Before and after the mergers, airline companies’pricing strategies are significantly affected by their competitors’strategies. (d) Before the mergers, because of the intense competition, it is the size of the competitors‘ market share that the company decide whether to take aggressive strategies. In the top 1000 competitive markets,airline companies will take aggressive actions to get more passengers for the punishment from its competitor is an incredible threat, however, if competitors collude together, airline companies will hardly dare to cut price. And the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is positive and significant. In the second competitive markets, since the average market share is twice bigger than in the top 1000 markets, airlines prefer not to participate in cut-throat competition. However, if competitors collude, then airline companies will cooperate together, and the effect of an increase in multimarket contact on price dispersion is negative and significant. After the mergers, increase in contacts with competitors would facilitate mutual forbearance and increase price dispersion and higher-percentile prices will increase more than lower-percentile prices.