The aim of this study was to investigate how the small state Norway could use special operations in cooperation with allies against the great power Germany during World War 2. According to Clausewitz, defense favors the defender, but how could a small state manage to create friction for the German defensive bases in Norway? Can a theory of special operations help us understand this phenomenon? Scholars have found a lack of empirical studies of special operations and small states which this study aims to remedy. This study used a qualitative approach and examined two special operations in Norway, Operation Archery 1941 and Musketoon 1942. The study uses Spulaks theory of special operations to enhance the understanding of the outcomes. The study concludes that both operations were considered successful at the operational level but Musketoon failed on the tactical level due to lack of integrated operations and maintaining relative superiority. The integration of the Norwegians was considered important for the completion of the missions due to knowledge of terrain and interaction with civilians. This study has given an empirical contribution to the research gap of special operations and small states.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-10032 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Zelahn, Gustaf |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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