Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement
For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two
acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological
personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not
justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as
some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right
to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only
develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral
significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will".
The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and
evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life.
Methodology and results
I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the
utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their
argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian
position, based on six particular arguments:
• Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral
argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its
underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary
notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance
of special obligations to special groups.
• Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently
discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears.
• Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of
prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions.
• Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human
condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very
possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism.
• The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as
convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian.
• There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human
beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian
theory.
As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral
significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and
pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability.
This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal
moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation
of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability
(viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human
fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life.
In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate"
position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human
prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop
their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the
opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of
life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I
explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent
of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which
termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated
research on human pre-embryos and stem cells. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling
Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer
dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe
intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te
ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar
regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van
selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag
wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is
egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone.
Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na
willekeur gedood mag word.
Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese
beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe
krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer.
Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings
Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise
van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul
argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die
utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente:
• Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele
argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die
onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in
kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele
belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe.
• Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent
diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde
van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur
die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste.
• Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir
ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die
eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van
die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs
moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing.
• Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel
kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie.
• Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike
wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie.
As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie
betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem
hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe
gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense.
Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van
voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van
ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die
gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende
afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n
reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word.
In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde"
posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens
wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die
geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie
beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies
moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie
oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die
ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna
terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/50542 |
| Date | 04 1900 |
| Creators | De Roubaix, J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm) |
| Contributors | Van Niekerk, A. A., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 230 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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