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Conflict, Patience, and Evolution

Preference is an important element in economic analysis, but usually regarded an inborn and exogenous characteristic. By the concept of natural selection, evolutionary game theory can explain lots of animal characteristics, including humans. With this idea, this paper extends the classical Hawk-Dove game to a two-period-life model, in which fights can cause deaths. We derive the population dynamics and the evolutiona-rily stable strategy. The competitive attitude and patience are determined by resource value and cost. And under a given common patience level, the evolutionarily stable strategy is a mixed strategy. But if the ¡§announcement effect,¡¨ an extra benefit from showing the winning record, is large enough, all-hawk may be the equilibrium. In ad-dition, under variable patient levels, the model can determine the equilibrium patience, and numerical simulation shows that dove-strategy accompanies a higher patient level than hawk.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0624109-015330
Date24 June 2009
CreatorsYu, Ming-huei
ContributorsShan-non Chin, Tru-Gin Liu, Shih-Shen Chen
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0624109-015330
Rightsnot_available, Copyright information available at source archive

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