In this thesis, I take a closer look at the meaning of life from an eschatological point of view. More precisely, the question at hand is whether and in what sense the existence of Hell would impact the meaning of life. The thesis primarily makes use of Joshua Seachris’s theories on what ‘the meaning of life’ denotes, dividing ‘meaning’ up into the subcategories of ‘intelligibility’, ‘purpose’, and ‘significance’. Three different answers to the research question are proposed, which crystallizes three different positions: Hell-optimism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would contribute to the meaning of life; Hell-neutralism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would have no effect on the meaning of life; and Hell-pessimism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would detract from the meaning of life. Arguments are given for each position, most appropriated from the broader meaning of life-discourse. On the basis of the evaluation of each argument, Hell-pessimism is considered the most probable of the three.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-444454 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Englund, Henry |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds