The topic of this thesis is institutional equilibrium, its formation and disruption in human systems. The thesis analyses what is common to the most human systems and concludes that it is some kind of redistribution. That is reason for the thesis title "Institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems". As the term institutional equilibrium comes from institutional economics, the thesis begins with characteristic institutional economy and its differences form mainstream economy, defines the term institution and methodological institutionalism and explains the reasons of institution evolution. Then, the problematic of redistribution is analyzed. The thesis brings a general model of a redistribution system and describes a coalition forming in it. The thesis concludes that such a process must be facilitated and regulated by institutions and that institutions define the negotiation strength of the players and stabilize their position. In a fourth chapter, the term of institutional equilibrium is defined and its preconditions and consequences are described. Factors preventing the redistribution system from reaching the equilibrium are shown. The analysis of institutional equilibrium formation follows; the open and closed systems are addressed separately, with the emphasis being put on open systems. In open systems, the creative destruction process in ever-present, disrupting the institutional equilibrium. Therefore, a question is posed: may there be such a structure of institutions which will stay unchanged despite the ongoing exogenous changes? Or, more precisely, the change of which will not be in the interest of the players? The thesis finds that the preconditions for institutions system facilitating the institutional equilibrium are investments into skills of the players and the open access into the system. The thesis also shows that such preconditions help to reduce undesirable redistribution. The fifth chapter analyses parallel redistribution games as one of the specific way of disturbing institutional equilibrium. The parallel redistribution games have secret character; their players do not want the other players to know about their game, because their game breaches the norms of the majority of players. The parallel redistribution games may be characterized as a form of opportunistic behavior. The thesis investigates the causes of these games, the reasons why they remain uncovered and the strategies of their players. Eventually, the conditions under which the parallel games may be reduced are formulated. The institutions must fulfill these conditions as well. In the end, the institutions structure capable of introducing the redistribution system into the institutional equilibrium state is defined.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:125184 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Wawrosz, Petr |
| Contributors | Kadeřábková, Božena, Chytil, Zdeněk, Hlaváček, Jiří |
| Publisher | Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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