Electronic devices such as phones and computers use cryptography to achieve
information security. However, while cryptographic algorithms may be strong
theoretically, their physical implementations in hardware can leak unintentional
side information as a byproduct of performing their computations. A device's
security can be compromised from this leakage through side-channel attacks.
Research in hardware security reveals how dangerous these attacks can be and
provides security countermeasures. This thesis focuses on a category of
side-channel attacks called fault attacks, and contributes a new fault attack
method that can compromise a cryptographic device more rapidly than the previous
methods when using practical fault injection techniques.
We observe that as a circuit is further overclocked, new faults are often
superimposed upon previous ones. We analyze the incremental changes rather than
the total sum in order to extract more secret information.
Unlike many previous methods, ours does not require precise fault injection
techniques and requires no knowledge of when the internal state is in a specific
algorithmic stage. Results are confirmed experimentally on hardware
implementations of AES-128, 192, and 256. / Thesis / Master of Applied Science (MASc)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/23808 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Pogue, Trevor |
| Contributors | Nicolici, Nicola, Electrical and Computer Engineering |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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