Zombie banks are banks that are practically insolvent but continue to exist through hiding bad loans on their balance sheet. This can be achieved by rolling over bad loans instead of writing them off, a process known as forbearance lending, zombie lending or evergreening.
Zombie banks have received increased attention of late, not least because of the sovereign debt and banking crisis in Europe. This follows other banking crises in the US and Japan which have equally seen an increased number of bank failures, and where insolvent companies have been kept alive by banks.
This study aims to give a theoretical assessment of the phenomenon around zombie banks and forbearance lending. Although zombie banks are the focus of a wide public debate, the existing research has not been able to fully explain many aspects around them, such as the several motives for forbearance lending, the impact of forbearance lending on the overall portfolio of zombie banks, or the right policy response in dealing with them. In light of this, the study presents three models that simulate the behavior of banks when rolling over bad loans. These models offer insights into the causes and effects of zombie banking, and also allow us to analyze the context of policy measures by the government and the central bank. To put the models into the right context, the study also provides a detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature as well as the practical experience with zombie banks and forbearance lending in Japan and Europe.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa.de:bsz:15-qucosa-159553 |
| Date | 28 January 2015 |
| Creators | Willam, Daniel |
| Contributors | Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Uwe Vollmer, Gunther Schnabl |
| Publisher | Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | doc-type:doctoralThesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
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