In this thesis I establish a hitherto unseen parallel between John Rawls’ theory of justice and utilitarian accounts with respect to population ethics; I argue that the absurd conclusions which plague utilitarianism also plague Rawls’ theory. These are the repugnant and preposterous conclusions. I then argue that Kant's political philosophy offers the resources to escape these absurd conclusions because of a crucial metaphysical difference between theories governed by outcome-oriented considerations and those governed by freedom-oriented constraints.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2291 |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Creators | Spence, Clay W |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2015 Clay W. Spence, default |
Page generated in 0.0018 seconds