In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uky.edu/oai:uknowledge.uky.edu:philosophy_etds-1011 |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Creators | Logan, Benjamin A. |
| Publisher | UKnowledge |
| Source Sets | University of Kentucky |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy |
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