What is it for something to be good? Using the example
of an Ebola-like microbe, I argue that a merely kind-based account of goodness
is defective (Chapter 1). I offer instead an account that is both kind-based
and platonic (Chapter 2). On such an account, goodness turns out to be
non-natural (Chapter 3). However, non-naturalists can explain why the goodness
of an individual supervenes on its natural properties, by appealing to the
essence of the kind to which it belongs (Chapter 4).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/14496189 |
| Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Creators | Berman Chan (10711287) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/The_Metaphysics_of_Goodness/14496189 |
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