I examine the difficulties that several philosophers of language are liable to encounter in their attempts to provide an account of the connection between truth and assertion. I then attempt to provide an account of this connection. The analysis is concerned chiefly with difficulties which consist in elucidating the conceptual connection between truth and assertion in a way that respects certain linguistic intuitions while at the same time rendering the concept of truth amenable to a semantic interpretation. The proposed view suggests one way in which we might go about meeting the theoretical demands implicit in addressing this concern, among others, demonstrating the extent to which a theory of truth should be regarded as belonging to the province of epistemology. Insofar as semantical considerations figure into such a theory, a more systematic investigation of the interface between epistemology and natural language semantics is recommended. The solution to many problems at this interface, I argue, lay in an analysis of judgment.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:USF/oai:scholarcommons.usf.edu:etd-3039 |
Date | 26 April 2009 |
Creators | Kelly, Jeremy J |
Publisher | Scholar Commons |
Source Sets | University of South Flordia |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Graduate Theses and Dissertations |
Rights | default |
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