Thomas Hobbes first law of nature states that 'each rational man shall and ought to endeavor peace'. Simultaneously, Hobbes first law of nature is perhaps the antithesis of his conception of man in nature (homo naturalis), where man is simply defined as an animal residing in an amoral and arbitrary environment in which every notion of "right and wrong" are connected to the individual's capacity for self-maximizing rationality. In turn, the social creature - zoon politikon - is the contradiction of Hobbes' homo naturalis: he is the impersonated restraint of the impulses and passions that leads him away from a life of an unending state of war into a moral and social community. Hobbes' social and moral creature is the result of a transition involving the creation of a social contract between an arbiter and the masses, binding them together in a shared fate: the excommunication of war and fear into the installment of peace and security. This essay addresses the transition of Hobbes conception of homo naturalis to his implicit understanding of zoon politikon; the transition from the amoral to the moral man. What implications does such a transition have for the egoistic-rational creature? What political and moral obligations are to be found between man and man, and between man and state? Finally, what is rational for the social creature to demand of the state?
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:liu-187695 |
Date | January 2022 |
Creators | Gustavsson, Jacob |
Publisher | Linköpings universitet, Avdelningen för filosofi och tillämpad etik |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | Swedish |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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