abstract: Ever since the registration of private banks was deregulated in Taiwan in 1991, the sector has suffered significant decline in profitability. Facing such a dynamic sector yet vital to domestic economy, what should the banks do to successfully improve their competiveness? As external changes are often unpredictable, the exploration and buildup of internal resources is a critical approach. This article focuses on how to effectively manage internal competition so as to upgrade business performance and accomplish organizational goals.
This article discusses the effects of the compensation system and employee incentives on business performance in banking in two areas. First of all, based on the statistics on the banking sector in Taiwan, it explores the regulating effects of different compensation systems on two conflicts in the industry. It also reviews the literature on Conflict Theory. Research shows that when people trust each other, they tend to accept a value statement different from theirs. And our research also shows that trust can minimize task conflict and relationship conflict between team members. Moreover, after identifying the role of compensation structure to trust and task conflict, this article further categorizes the structure into team performance reward and individual performance reward. Analysis points out that when the organization bases compensation payment on team performance reward, the relationship between trust and task conflict is higher than that on individual performance reward. That is, team performance reward better helps to reinforce such correlation compared to individual performance reward.
Second, the research studies different forms of employee incentives in Taiwan’s banking sector as well as resulting performance. During the studied period, the majority of the financial institutions preferred cash bonus. In addition, financial institutions also take other incentives. Cash bonus covered the highest percentage, followed by share bonus, treasury repo and transfer, and options in order. We study the ROEs under different incentives and conclude it is higher and more stable in the institutions offering multiple employee shares instead of single method. Whether the incentives are implemented also influence the level of net ROE. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2016
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:38484 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Contributors | Ming, Cheng (Author), Lee, Peggy (Advisor), Chen, Hong (Advisor), Chang, Chun (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 81 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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