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Freedom consequentialism: In support of a new measure of utility

Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot
take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it
dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead
to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in
which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these
problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:canterbury.ac.nz/oai:ir.canterbury.ac.nz:10092/9033
Date January 2013
CreatorsMcKay, Daniel Christopher
PublisherUniversity of Canterbury. Philosophy
Source SetsUniversity of Canterbury
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic thesis or dissertation, Text
RightsCopyright Daniel Christopher McKay, http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/thesis/etheses_copyright.shtml
RelationNZCU

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