Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

The thesis is an examination of the familiar objection that Consequentialism is unreasonably demanding (hereafter the Demandingness Objection). The focus is on attempts to construct a moral theory which avoids making unreasonable demands, without departing too much from traditional Consequentialism. The thesis is in two parts. In Part ONE, a wide range of contemporary forms of Consequentialism are examined, particularly the theories of Parfit, Brandt, Hooker, Murphy, Slote and Scheffler. It is argued that none of these is able to provide an adequate response to the Demandingness Objection. In Part TWO, a new Consequentialist theory is sketched. The core of this theory is a theoretical innovation: nonproportional accounts of the relationships between the values of outcomes, the costs faced by agents, and the lightness or wrongness of actions. It is argued that such accounts can provide the basis for a response to the Demandingness Objection. It is also argued that nonproportional elements can be incorporated into the theories of Scheffler and Parfit, and that the resulting theories are superior to the originals. It is concluded that the notion of nonproportionality is worthy of further exploration, and that the best possible Consequentialist moral theory is very likely to incorporate some non-proportional elements. It is also concluded that it would be premature to assume that Consequentialists will never be able to put together an adequate response to the Demandingness Objection.

Should the authorities observe the rules regarding the treatment of enemy combatants, or is it morally justified for the authorities to violate some human rights in order to make everyone safer? Some moral theorists are committed to the claim that using torture for the greater good is not only permissible but also obligatory. One of the key goals of my thesis is to undermine this sort of claim. Contemporary consequentialists, such as Philip Pettit, hold that an agent is always permitted to bring about a certain state of affairs solely on the grounds that the state of affairs is the best state of affairs, impersonally judged. Derek Parfit agrees with Pettit's claim, arguing that a reductionist account of persons offers support for moral theories tha tfail to acknowledge the fact that each person is a separate unit of moral concern. I reject Parfit's assumption that the natural separateness of persons is morally insignificant: if we imagine a species of person that is not naturally separate from each other, it is reasonable to suppose that the moral norms of this different species of person would be drastically different from deeply entrenched human moral norms. I conjecture that the separateness of persons offers a rationale for restrictions against grossly assaulting and killing innocent persons. Samuel Scheffler argues that restrictions are so strong they are paradoxical. I counter this charge by arguing that restrictions need not categorically bar types of actions like killing innocent people, but rather should limit consequentialist justifications for these types of actions. Such a distinction addresses the air of paradox that surrounds restrictions because it allows for the possibility that agent-relative reasons justify why agents may assault or kill when the agent is confronted with a tragic moral dilemma. Agent-relative reasons are relevant to moral justification because human persons value the world around them from the first person point of view. In order for morality to appropriately acknowledge this feature of human persons, it must be permissible for humans to adopt a partial attitude toward their own actions, lives and loved ones.

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Should the authorities observe the rules regarding the treatment of enemy combatants, or is it morally justified for the authorities to violate some human rights in order to make everyone safer? Some moral theorists are committed to the claim that using torture for the greater good is not only permissible but also obligatory. One of the key goals of my thesis is to undermine this sort of claim. Contemporary consequentialists, such as Philip Pettit, hold that an agent is always permitted to bring about a certain state of affairs solely on the grounds that the state of affairs is the best state of affairs, impersonally judged. Derek Parfit agrees with Pettit's claim, arguing that a reductionist account of persons offers support for moral theories tha tfail to acknowledge the fact that each person is a separate unit of moral concern. I reject Parfit's assumption that the natural separateness of persons is morally insignificant: if we imagine a species of person that is not naturally separate from each other, it is reasonable to suppose that the moral norms of this different species of person would be drastically different from deeply entrenched human moral norms. I conjecture that the separateness of persons offers a rationale for restrictions against grossly assaulting and killing innocent persons. Samuel Scheffler argues that restrictions are so strong they are paradoxical. I counter this charge by arguing that restrictions need not categorically bar types of actions like killing innocent people, but rather should limit consequentialist justifications for these types of actions. Such a distinction addresses the air of paradox that surrounds restrictions because it allows for the possibility that agent-relative reasons justify why agents may assault or kill when the agent is confronted with a tragic moral dilemma. Agent-relative reasons are relevant to moral justification because human persons value the world around them from the first person point of view. In order for morality to appropriately acknowledge this feature of human persons, it must be permissible for humans to adopt a partial attitude toward their own actions, lives and loved ones.

Thesis (doctoral)--Stockholm University, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [204]-207) and index.

Should the authorities observe the rules regarding the treatment of enemy combatants, or is it morally justified for the authorities to violate some human rights in order to make everyone safer? Some moral theorists are committed to the claim that using torture for the greater good is not only permissible but also obligatory. One of the key goals of my thesis is to undermine this sort of claim. Contemporary consequentialists, such as Philip Pettit, hold that an agent is always permitted to bring about a certain state of affairs solely on the grounds that the state of affairs is the best state of affairs, impersonally judged. Derek Parfit agrees with Pettit's claim, arguing that a reductionist account of persons offers support for moral theories tha tfail to acknowledge the fact that each person is a separate unit of moral concern. I reject Parfit's assumption that the natural separateness of persons is morally insignificant: if we imagine a species of person that is not naturally separate from each other, it is reasonable to suppose that the moral norms of this different species of person would be drastically different from deeply entrenched human moral norms. I conjecture that the separateness of persons offers a rationale for restrictions against grossly assaulting and killing innocent persons. Samuel Scheffler argues that restrictions are so strong they are paradoxical. I counter this charge by arguing that restrictions need not categorically bar types of actions like killing innocent people, but rather should limit consequentialist justifications for these types of actions. Such a distinction addresses the air of paradox that surrounds restrictions because it allows for the possibility that agent-relative reasons justify why agents may assault or kill when the agent is confronted with a tragic moral dilemma. Agent-relative reasons are relevant to moral justification because human persons value the world around them from the first person point of view. In order for morality to appropriately acknowledge this feature of human persons, it must be permissible for humans to adopt a partial attitude toward their own actions, lives and loved ones. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world. Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better, e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy. Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.

後果論（Consequentialism）和義務論（Deontology）是規範倫理學裏兩個基本理論。兩個理論之間的差異，經常成為討論基本倫理問題的框架。一方面，義務論認為後果論道德上容許任何能達到最好結果的行為，這是過於寬鬆。另一方面，後果論認為義務論是自相矛盾的；因為它既禁止某些行為，視之為不道德，但又不容許人們以違反義務為手段，整體減少這類行為發生的次數。 / 這篇論文的旨趣是研究用後果論的理論框架，來表達義務論的可能性。這將提供一個新的視角，以了解後果論和義務論的基本理論差異。 / 全文共分四個部分。第一章，我會檢視兩個理論的一些基本特徵。第二章，我第一次嘗試用後果論的理論框架來表達義務論。方法是給違反義務的行為分配一個負面道德價值。然而，這方法不能成功把義務論表達為一種後果論。因為它引申了一些義務論不接受的道德判斷。第三章，我會檢視義務論和道德價值之間的關係；並順著 Louise (2004) 提出的理論，論證後果論的理論框架可以用來表達義務論。方法是把遵從義務的行為視為把時間和行動者相對 (time-relative and agent-relative) 的道德價值最大化。第四章，我將嘗試回應對這理論可能提出的反駁。 / Discussions in basic ethical problems are often framed by the essential differences between consequentialism and deontology - two fundamental theories in normative ethics. Most arguments in those ethical problems are basically reiteration of how the two theories differs from each other: Deontology holds that consequentialism is too lax as it allows all actions that leads to the best outcome, while consequentialism holds that deontology is essentially paradoxical because it forbids agents to act against a constraint even when doing so can avoid more violations. / My interest in this thesis is to examine a possible alternative in characterizing the differences between consequentialism and deontology, namely the doctrine of "consequentializing deontology". This doctrine holds that all deontological theories can be given a representation in consequentialist form. / This thesis consists of four parts. In Chapter 1, I will first examine three essential features of consequentialism, namely it is structurally axiological, teleological and maximizing. Then I will examine various formulations of deontological constraints and argue that they are best formulated as agent-relative reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I will explicate the first attempt to consequentialize deontological constraints by assigning a negative weighing to any violation. I will show that this attempt is not satisfactory because it entails a number of implausible claims. In Chapter 3, I proceed to examine various accounts that explain the normative power of deontological constraints in terms of values. Following Louise (2004), I argue that deontology can be consequentialized by giving a consequentialist representation to deontology, so that when an agent acts upon a deontological constraint, he is maximizing values that are both agent-relative and temporal-relative in nature. In Chapter 4, I will examine possible challenges to consequentializing deontology and respond to them. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Chan, Pui Yee June. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Delineating Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology: A Possible Alternative to Characterizing the Differences between Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Overview --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- What Makes a Theory in Normative Ethics Consequentialist? --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Conception of Outcome: Future-Oriented is Not a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.13 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Maximizing is a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.17 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Consequentialism Essentials Summarized --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4 --- Deontological Constraints --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Absolute and Threshold Deontological Constraints --- p.26 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Agent-Relative & Agent-Neutral Reasons for Action: Two Approaches --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Deontological Constraints & Reasons for Action --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Attempt of Consequentializing Deontology without Agent-Relativity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction & the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Threshold Constraints --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Absolute Constraints --- p.42 / Chapter 2.4 --- Limits and Problems with Consequentializing Deontology --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- Responding to Challenges --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.50 / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary: Consequentializing Deontology Fails --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Deontology and Agent-Relative Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology and Agent-Relativity in Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction in Values --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Agent-Relative & Temporal-Relative Values --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2 --- Nagel: Agent-Relative Reasons and Agent-Relative Values --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Reasons of Autonomy --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Reasons of Deontology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Korsgaard: Deontology and Inter-subjectivity --- p.70 / Chapter 3.4 --- Pettit: The Honoring/Promoting Distinction as the Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Values that cannot be honored --- p.80 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- It is not always clear what counts as "honoring" a value --- p.82 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Honoring is promoting agent-relative value --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Consequentializing Deontology - Its Limits and Implications --- p.88 / Chapter 4.1 --- Thesis Project Recap --- p.88 / Chapter 4.2 --- Consequentializing deontology and agent-relativity --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3 --- Extended application of consequentializing to other ethical theories --- p.99 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fragmentation of values and consequentializing --- p.101 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion: How successful consequentializing contributes to moral discussions --- p.104 / Bibliography --- p.107

This paper focuses on Brad Hooker's moral theory which is a version of rule-consequentialism and is developed in Ideal Code, Real World. The paper starts with a reconstruction of the theory. I then go on to criticize Hooker on mainly two points. The first point is on the matter of the "disaster-clause". I present here a modified example from Leonard Kahn: a choice between saving your own city with all members of your family and friends versus another arbitrary city with a few more people living in it. Hooker does not say much about the extent of a person's obligations and priority towards family and friends. So, it is worth asking: does the theory cohere with what we know about our human nature, and would Hooker's theory and a plausible account human nature reach the same conclusion as far as this particular example is concerned? The second point focuses on the issue of the internalization condition. This comes in two varieties: one can recommend internalization of one code by everyone (absolute rule-consequentialism), on the one hand, or internalization of different codes for different groups (relative rule-consequentialism). Which one should be preferred? I will argue for nation-relative rule-consequentialism, and will do so from a consequentialist perspective. I will do this by first arguing that there exist differences in people's conventional morality – something Hooker does not seem to take into consideration to a sufficient degree. I will try to show that if we have differences in conventional morality, then the reasons for preferring national internalization of codes are stronger from a global perspective.