Demandingness-based objections to utilitarianism and other consequentialist moral theories constitute the most important problem facing moral philosophers today. In this Thesis, I offer an explanation of what makes the demandingness objection compelling, namely, that utilitarianism alienates us from the projects and goals that define us as individual human beings (normally taken to be a separate objection). This suggests that solving the problems demandingness considerations present involves carving out a space for these projects and goals alongside the demands of a consequentialist morality; thus, we have two nearly independent sources of normative reasons, and the real question is how they interact. Various suggestions for answering this question are considered and rejected. I also discuss how Alastair Norcross’ scalar utilitarianism “solves” the demandingness problem, what the costs of this solution are, and how it might be integrated into a theory concerning the aforementioned interaction.

Demandingness-based objections to utilitarianism and other consequentialist moral theories constitute the most important problem facing moral philosophers today. In this Thesis, I offer an explanation of what makes the demandingness objection compelling, namely, that utilitarianism alienates us from the projects and goals that define us as individual human beings (normally taken to be a separate objection). This suggests that solving the problems demandingness considerations present involves carving out a space for these projects and goals alongside the demands of a consequentialist morality; thus, we have two nearly independent sources of normative reasons, and the real question is how they interact. Various suggestions for answering this question are considered and rejected. I also discuss how Alastair Norcross’ scalar utilitarianism “solves” the demandingness problem, what the costs of this solution are, and how it might be integrated into a theory concerning the aforementioned interaction.

A tese analisa a relação íntima que há entre o pragmatismo ou o conseqüencialismo e a modulação temporal dos efeitos das decisões judiciais. Nesta relação, interessa ressaltar o ponto de interseção que certamente sobressai em várias ocasiões: o argumento de cunho econômico. Tal tipo de argumento pode assumir especial relevo quando do exame da oportunidade e conveniência na tomada das decisões eminentemente políticas. No âmbito jurisdicional, no entanto, o argumento pragmático ou consequencialista de cunho econômico não deve prevalecer como fundamento das decisões judiciais, especialmente cuidando-se de matéria tributária. Os problemas que centralizam o estudo podem ser colocados através das seguintes indagações: é possível que o Supremo Tribunal Federal compute, no julgamento de certa matéria tributária, argumento como o eventual rombo de X bilhões de reais que a decisão contrária ao Fisco possa acarretar para os cofres públicos? A fundamentação de eventual decisão judicial calcada exclusiva ou predominantemente em tal argumento é legítima ou ilegítima? Que importância pode ter na tomada de decisão judicial? Quando aplicada, há parâmetros a serem seguidos? Quais? Demonstramos que a prevalência de tal argumento é inadequada na seara judicial, ou seja, deve ter peso reduzido ou periférico, servindo para corroborar ou reforçar os argumentos jurídicos que centralizam o debate submetido ao exame do Poder Judiciário de modo geral, e do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de maneira particular. Em busca de esclarecer quais os principais limites e possibilidades de tal argumento, especialmente relacionando-o à modulação temporal dos efeitos da decisão judicial, explicitamos algumas regras necessárias para a sua adequada utilização, sob pena de inconcebível subversão de variados princípios e direitos fundamentais assegurados em sede constitucional. No exame das questões submetidas à apreciação da Corte Suprema em matéria tributária, o seu parâmetro consiste na maior efetividade e concretude ao texto constitucional. A modulação temporal dos efeitos se aplica a uma decisão que, declarando a inconstitucionalidade do ato normativo, se afastaria ainda mais da vontade constitucional, caso fosse aplicado o tradicional efeito ex tunc (retroativo até o nascimento da lei). Nestas situações específicas e excepcionais se justifica aplicar a modulação, com vistas a dar maior concretude e emprestar maior eficácia à Constituição. A tese proposta, ao final, consiste na reunião das regras explicitadas no trabalho e em proposta legislativa. / The thesis examines the intimate relationship that exists between pragmatism or consequentialism and the temporal modulation of the effects of judgments. In this connection, it is interesting to highlight the point of intersection that certainly stands out on several occasions: the economic argument. This type of argument may be particularly relevant when considering the opportunity and convenience in making the highly political decisions. On the jurisdictional ground, however, the pragmatic or consequentialist argument should not prevail as the basis of judicial decisions, especially in taking care tax matters. The problems that centralize the study can be placed through the following questions: is it possible that the Supreme Court compute, in the trial of certain tax matters, any argument as the "deficit of X billions of reais" that the decision contrary to the tax authorities can result in the public purse? The basis for any judicial decision exclusively or predominantly in such an argument is legitimate or illegitimate? How important can have on judicial decision-making? When applied, there are parameters to be followed? Which? We have shown that the prevalence of such an argument is inappropriate in the judicial field, i.e., must have low weight or peripheral, serving to support or strengthen the legal arguments that center the debate before the examination of the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in a particular way. Seeking to clarify the main limits and possibilities of such an argument, especially as related to the temporal modulation of the effects of judicial decision, we elucidate some rules necessary for its proper use, otherwise inconceivable subversion of various principles and fundamental rights guaranteed on constitutional ground. In examining the issues submitted to the Supreme Court in tax matters, its parameter is the greater effectiveness and concreteness to the constitutional text. The temporal modulation of the effects apply to a decision which, declaring the unconstitutionality of the legislative act, keep away the constitutional will if applied the traditional effect ex tunc (retroactive to the birth of the law). In these specific situations and circumstances its justifiable to apply the modulation, in order to give greater concreteness and bring greater efficiency to the Constitution. The proposition, as conclusion of the thesis, is the reunion of the rules set out in the work and in a legislative proposal.

A tese analisa a relação íntima que há entre o pragmatismo ou o conseqüencialismo e a modulação temporal dos efeitos das decisões judiciais. Nesta relação, interessa ressaltar o ponto de interseção que certamente sobressai em várias ocasiões: o argumento de cunho econômico. Tal tipo de argumento pode assumir especial relevo quando do exame da oportunidade e conveniência na tomada das decisões eminentemente políticas. No âmbito jurisdicional, no entanto, o argumento pragmático ou consequencialista de cunho econômico não deve prevalecer como fundamento das decisões judiciais, especialmente cuidando-se de matéria tributária. Os problemas que centralizam o estudo podem ser colocados através das seguintes indagações: é possível que o Supremo Tribunal Federal compute, no julgamento de certa matéria tributária, argumento como o eventual rombo de X bilhões de reais que a decisão contrária ao Fisco possa acarretar para os cofres públicos? A fundamentação de eventual decisão judicial calcada exclusiva ou predominantemente em tal argumento é legítima ou ilegítima? Que importância pode ter na tomada de decisão judicial? Quando aplicada, há parâmetros a serem seguidos? Quais? Demonstramos que a prevalência de tal argumento é inadequada na seara judicial, ou seja, deve ter peso reduzido ou periférico, servindo para corroborar ou reforçar os argumentos jurídicos que centralizam o debate submetido ao exame do Poder Judiciário de modo geral, e do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de maneira particular. Em busca de esclarecer quais os principais limites e possibilidades de tal argumento, especialmente relacionando-o à modulação temporal dos efeitos da decisão judicial, explicitamos algumas regras necessárias para a sua adequada utilização, sob pena de inconcebível subversão de variados princípios e direitos fundamentais assegurados em sede constitucional. No exame das questões submetidas à apreciação da Corte Suprema em matéria tributária, o seu parâmetro consiste na maior efetividade e concretude ao texto constitucional. A modulação temporal dos efeitos se aplica a uma decisão que, declarando a inconstitucionalidade do ato normativo, se afastaria ainda mais da vontade constitucional, caso fosse aplicado o tradicional efeito ex tunc (retroativo até o nascimento da lei). Nestas situações específicas e excepcionais se justifica aplicar a modulação, com vistas a dar maior concretude e emprestar maior eficácia à Constituição. A tese proposta, ao final, consiste na reunião das regras explicitadas no trabalho e em proposta legislativa. / The thesis examines the intimate relationship that exists between pragmatism or consequentialism and the temporal modulation of the effects of judgments. In this connection, it is interesting to highlight the point of intersection that certainly stands out on several occasions: the economic argument. This type of argument may be particularly relevant when considering the opportunity and convenience in making the highly political decisions. On the jurisdictional ground, however, the pragmatic or consequentialist argument should not prevail as the basis of judicial decisions, especially in taking care tax matters. The problems that centralize the study can be placed through the following questions: is it possible that the Supreme Court compute, in the trial of certain tax matters, any argument as the "deficit of X billions of reais" that the decision contrary to the tax authorities can result in the public purse? The basis for any judicial decision exclusively or predominantly in such an argument is legitimate or illegitimate? How important can have on judicial decision-making? When applied, there are parameters to be followed? Which? We have shown that the prevalence of such an argument is inappropriate in the judicial field, i.e., must have low weight or peripheral, serving to support or strengthen the legal arguments that center the debate before the examination of the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in a particular way. Seeking to clarify the main limits and possibilities of such an argument, especially as related to the temporal modulation of the effects of judicial decision, we elucidate some rules necessary for its proper use, otherwise inconceivable subversion of various principles and fundamental rights guaranteed on constitutional ground. In examining the issues submitted to the Supreme Court in tax matters, its parameter is the greater effectiveness and concreteness to the constitutional text. The temporal modulation of the effects apply to a decision which, declaring the unconstitutionality of the legislative act, keep away the constitutional will if applied the traditional effect ex tunc (retroactive to the birth of the law). In these specific situations and circumstances its justifiable to apply the modulation, in order to give greater concreteness and bring greater efficiency to the Constitution. The proposition, as conclusion of the thesis, is the reunion of the rules set out in the work and in a legislative proposal.

Social discounting aims to compare the respective future consequences of differing courses of action for human well-being, and so to help decide on policies for matters as varied as climate change, transport and criminal justice. Social discounting is widely used, though some decisions are too trivial, or too urgent, for it to be justified. Even so, its pervasive use is at variance with scepticism about its moral foundations, and about whether the comparisons that it claims to make can be made at all. Debate has, however, concentrated on how, rather than on whether, social discounting should be done and the conditions upon which it must be based seem never to have been set out systematically. This thesis aims to fill that gap, by explaining the moral and practical conditions that must be met for social discounting to be justified. The conditions are demanding. It behoves policy makers to satisfy themselves more carefully than is now done that the conditions are met in respect of the decisions where use of social discounting is proposed, and to consider alternatives where one or more conditions is not met. The thesis takes for granted that human well-being counts morally. But social discounting requires that well-being is capable of being described through an objective list of desiderata and that some aspect of well-being is measurable, at least on a cardinal scale and inter-personally, implying commensurabilities amongst some of the things comprising or contributing to well-being. Some moral theories incorporate priorities, such as property rights or the interests of poor people. Priorities range from easy to meet to very difficult. Priorities of the latter type are inconsistent with social discounting, and are the basis for theories as varied as those of Nozick and Nussbaum. This thesis suggests that the theories consistent with social discounting may collectively be called ‘moderate welfarism’. Moderate welfarism allows room for priorities and other moral considerations provided only that the monetisable aspect of social well-being is morally important. Moderate welfarism is necessary but not sufficient for social discounting to be justifiable. Practical difficulties may make it incapable of implementation. One such difficulty is the well-known epistemic problem, but the thesis sets out nine such difficulties, each implying a condition that must be met if social discounting is to be capable of practical use. The thesis concludes that the moral and practical conditions that must be met for social discounting to be justified are demanding and, more speculatively, that some of the conditions are not widely understood leading to inappropriate use of the technique by governments.

The nonidentity problem is the issue of how to justify the belief that it is wrong to bring a person into existence if they would have a flawed life, though still worth living, instead of bringing another, nonidentical person into existence who would have a better life. To have an impaired life that is worth living seems to be a good existence, at least for the person in question. The nonidentity problem was made known mostly by Derek Parfit. The problem draws attention to three intuitions that seemingly cannot all be correct. How we respond to this predicament and which intuitions a solution depends on have severe implications primarily in population ethics but it will also affect other areas, to mention a few; genetic engineering, if and how to correct historical wrongdoing, and just resource management. In this essay, I will discuss David Boonin’s objections to previously proposed approaches to handle the nonidentity problem and his proposal on a solution. The conclusion I will draw is that although Boonin presents an answer based on a strategy of biting the bullet he fails to show how this is a plausible response to the nonidentity problem. Instead, I argue for my preferred strategy to tackle the problem by referring to a consequentialist moral theory such as utilitarianism. I intend to show that such a theory provides the most plausible solution and make the case that Boonin’s critique of such an approach is unjustified.

A presente dissertação possui por objeto discutir o controle judicial da atividade normativa das agências reguladoras no direito brasileiro. O trabalho é dividido em três partes. Na primeira, é analisa a evolução do princípio da separação de poderes ao longo dos séculos XIX e XX, bem como a receptividade dele no início do século XXI, notadamente em virtude do processo de retirada do Estado da intervenção direta na economia, como prestador de serviços aos cidadãos, e sua recolocação como regulador das atividades econômicas. Também é analisada na primeira parte como tais mudanças econômicas e sociais implicaram em uma alteração do papel do Poder Judiciário que, inicialmente criado como o menos ativo dos poderes, tornou-se órgão central para a efetivação dos direitos da democracia contemporânea. Na segunda parte, é analisada a atividade normativa das agências reguladoras, com a defesa da tese da delegação legislativa, bem como com a verificação dos requisitos procedimentais e materiais que devem ser observados pelas agências reguladoras na expedição dos atos normativos e de como tais requisitos acabam por limitar a discricionariedade dos entes reguladores. Na terceira parte, é feita a verificação do controle judicial da regulação, tendo como premissas a adoção pelo direito brasileiro do sistema da unidade de jurisdição e as diferenças funcionais entre o Judiciário e a Administração no estabelecimento de políticas públicas, com a defesa de que o controle judicial dos atos normativos das agências reguladoras deve se dar de modo negativo, ou seja, sem que o Judiciário possua competência para a estipulação da política regulatória a ser seguida, e de forma responsiva, ou seja, com a análise das consequências do controle judicial sobre o setor regulado, devendo o magistrado analisar não apenas os aspectos de legalidade do normativo questionado, mas também a finalidade do sistema regulado e os impactos que a decisão judicial terá sobre ele. / The object of the current thesis is to discuss the judicial control of the normative activity of the regulatory agencies according to Brazilian law. This paper is divided into three parts. At first, the evolution of the principle of the separation of powers across the Nineteenth and the Twentieth century will be analyzed, as well as the reception of such principle in the early Twenty-one century, especially due to the process of disengagement of the State from the direct intervention in the economy (as a provider of services to the citizens) and its replacement as a regulator of economic activities. Also in the first part, it will be analyzed how such economical and social changes caused a modification of the role of the Judiciary branch which, initially, was created as the less active of the State powers, becoming the central body for the effectiveness of the contemporary democracy rights. The second part analyzes the normative activity of the regulatory agencies, with the defense of the thesis of legislative delegation, as well as with the verification of the procedural and material requirements that must be observed by the regulatory agencies in the issuance of normative rulings and how such requirements end up limiting the discretion of the regulatory bodies. In the third part the verification of the judicial control of such regulation is carried out, having as its premises the adoption, by Brazilian law, of the unity of jurisdiction system and the functional differences between the Judiciary branch and the Public Administration in the establishment of public policies, being defended that the judicial control of the regulatory agencies normative rulings must be made in a negative manner, i.e., without the Judiciary having the competence for the stipulation of the regulatory policy to be followed, as well as in a responsive manner, i.e., with the analysis of the consequences of the judicial control over the regulated sector, being the magistrate responsible for analyzing not only the aspects of legality of the questioned normative rulings, but also the objective of the regulated system and the impacts of the judicial decision on it.

A hipótese do trabalho é a de que o Supremo Tribunal Federal utiliza argumentos consequencialistas para admitir e julgar o controle de constitucionalidade de leis e normas orçamentárias. A tese é dividida em duas partes. Na primeira são tratados os temas que fundam a análise argumentativa das decisões judiciais. A argumentação jurídica é proposta como lente de exame das decisões judiciais, especialmente o ramo da retórica. De acordo com esse referencial teórico, os tribunais e juízes buscam convencer o auditório de que produzem a decisão mais adequada possível. É ressaltada a importância do argumento na formação do precedente, no que há de fundamental nas decisões (ratio decidendi) e no que é periférico (obiter dictum). O argumento consequencialista é visto diante de diversas teorias que o propõem, como o utilitarismo e o pragmatismo, com destaque, em capítulo próprio, para a teoria de Neil MacCormick, que propõe um consequencialismo essencialmente jurídico. Em sua segunda parte, a tese explora os temas que levarão às conclusões da hipótese. Em primeiro lugar, as características marcantes da produção de leis e normas orçamentárias, sua natureza jurídica e seu fundamento de validade. É revisto o controle de constitucionalidade dessas normas no ordenamento brasileiro, sendo pontuadas as particularidades e limites pertinentes ao seu controle principal. E por fim, no último capítulo, são analisadas pormenorizadamente as decisões que o Supremo Tribunal Federal produziu no controle principal de leis e normas orçamentárias, demarcando a presença de argumentos consequencialistas e buscando estabelecer quais são os precedentes vigentes no direito brasileiro. Ao fim, conclui-se que o controle de constitucionalidade principal é a via mais adequada nas matérias orçamentárias; que o precedente estabelecido no Supremo Tribunal Federal é o de possibilidade de controle de constitucionalidade principal de normas orçamentárias por ADI e ADO, não por ADPF; e que o tribunal usa adequadamente, na maioria das vezes, os argumentos consequencialistas, porquanto estes predominam (ratio decidendi) nas decisões mais importantes sobre a matéria. / The hypothesis of this work is that the Supreme Court uses consequentialist arguments to admit the judicial review of budgetary laws. The thesis is divided in two parts. In the first, the themes that underlie the argumentative analysis of judicial decisions are discussed. Legal argumentation is proposed as a lens for examining decisions, especially rhetoric. According to this theoretical framework, the courts and judges seek to convince the audience that they produce the most appropriate decisions possible. It highlights the significance of the argument in shaping the precedent, in what is crucial in decisions (ratio decidendi), and what is peripheral (obiter dictum). The consequentialist argument is analyzed according to the various theories that underlie it, such as utilitarianism and pragmatism, especially, in a separate chapter, according to Neil MacCormicks theory, that offers an essentially legal consequentialism. In its second part, the thesis explores the issues that lead to the conclusions of the hypothesis. Firstly, the salient features of the production of budget laws, its legal status and fundament of validity. The judicial review of these laws in the Brazilian legal system is revised, and the limits and particularities of its main control are punctuated. And finally, in the last chapter, the decisions produced by the Supreme Court in the main judicial review of budgetary laws are minutely explored, the existence of consequentialist arguments is indicated, and it seeks to establish the precedents existing in Brazilian law. It concludes, lastly, that the abstract judicial review is the most suitable option in budget matters; that the precedent set in the Supreme Court is about the possibility of the abstract judicial review of budgetary laws by ADI and ADO, but not ADPF; and that the court properly uses, most often, consequentialist arguments, and they predominate (ratio decidendi) in the most important decisions about it.

The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views. Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility attributions to an objective relation. Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences. I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable. Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist stance towards group agency talk. Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic argument against consequentialism.

This Thesis will examine how the framing of ‘trolley problems’ incorrectly motivates arithmetic rankings of states of affairs by removing context. This is problematic because the context of these problems provides the tools to solve moral dilemmas by allowing one to analyze the relevant motivations, moral implications, duties, values, and personal and societal obligations that one has. I will discuss Samuel Scheffler’s charge that a paradox exists within agent-centered restrictions and how his abstract paradigmatic case leads to arithmetic rankings of choices, which are both unrealistic and lead to tragic and morally unacceptable decision making. I will argue that Allen Wood’s Middle Theory can help dispel the apparent paradox and demonstrate a better way to examine ‘trolley problems’. I will further discuss how Martha Nussbaum’s analysis of tragic questions illuminates the issues surrounding such problems providing a morally acceptable way to account for the occasional unavoidable harm that results in decision-making caused by solving ‘trolley problems.’ Taken together, Wood’s and Nussbaum’s theories and analysis provide potential solutions to ‘trolley problems.’